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Despite uncertainty and difficulties in the modern Russian Federation, the regime 
enjoys massive popularity among its people, with approval ratings unrivaled in the past 
twenty-five years. This is a result of a carefully constructed narrative, pieced together 
using the strongest elements of Soviet and Tsarist propaganda, and enforced with 
censorship techniques borrowed from Stalin. 
This thesis establishes the continuity in both the propagated narrative and the 
censorship techniques employed by the Tsars, Stalin, and Putin. It also demonstrates an 
evolution of Putin’s narrative, showing new innovations that have permitted the leader to 
maintain a strong level of support from the Russian populace, while silencing dissent. 
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It is February in Sochi. A blue mural covers a wall with the words, “Sochi 2014,” 
written in Cyrillic and Latin script, framed next to abstract artwork. Russian President 
Vladimir Putin has gone to great lengths to ensure that this event displays the unity and 
strength of the Russian Federation, fifteen years after his rise to power. Such elegant 
murals are a commonplace element of this campaign.1 
On this day, however, five women and two men walk briskly toward the mural to 
film a different kind of message. They are armed with microphones and a small digital 
video camera. The group rapidly dons ski masks and commences a protest performance. 
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, lead singer of the provocatively named band “Pussy Riot,” 
stands out front; she is wearing a blue ski mask and a pink top. She begins head-banging, 
as the group starts chanting, in Russian, “Putin will teach you to love your country.”2 
Apparently, uniformed Cossack militia members are already standing by—they 
arrive within seconds to restore Putin’s order. One of the militia members hoses 
Tolokonnikova’s face with pepper spray. She screams, but quickly resumes chanting with 
the rest of the group.   Bystanders capture the event on video as the Cossacks produce 
horsewhips, which they swing in vicious arcs at the band members and a masked 
cameraman. The protesters continue their efforts, even as the ski masks are ripped from 
their faces. As Tolokonnikova is hurled to the pavement, a jacket is thrown over her, and 
lashes rain down on her defenseless body.3 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This bizarre, brutal confrontation is but one of many conflicts within Russia 
between two opposing narratives—a civil war of ideologies in which Putin seems to hold 
most of the advantages. The demise of the Soviet Union opened Russia to Western 
                                                 
1 The Telegraph, “Pussy Riot Attacked with Whips by Police at Sochi,” YouTube video, 19 February 
2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ivT-I-yxtdY; citation applies to entire paragraph. 
2 Ibid.; citation applies to entire paragraph. 
3 Ibid. 
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innovation and culture, bringing significant change to Russia’s political and technological 
landscape in the past few decades. The Internet has linked the people of Russia to the 
outside world as never before, creating a global awareness that was impossible in the 
early days of the Russian Federation, let alone the Soviet Union. On the other hand, this 
exposure seems to bring such traditional values as Russian Orthodoxy and allegiance to 
the state under attack by Western ideas, including liberal globalization and moral 
ambiguity. Putin’s regime has had to quell dissension from within, even as it faces 
scathing criticism from without. 
Even so, the Russian Federation has enjoyed great domestic success in 
propagating its own narrative, as a democracy, a moral bastion, and a legitimate heir to 
the Soviet Union’s political clout. Communication is the key to Russia’s image, and the 
current government has employed modern and traditional means to shape that image 
masterfully. This thesis will examine to what extent Putin’s narrative and censorship 
controls mark a continuity with policies and tools employed by the Soviet Union and 
Tsarist Russia. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Putin’s local support base grows seemingly more loyal, almost to the point of 
fanaticism. His mastery of the message is evident. In the unswerving Putin line, the riots 
that resulted in the March 2014 overthrow of Ukraine’s government are decried as a 
fascist movement, while the transvestite winner of the same year’s Eurovision talent 
contest is deemed an abomination. Liberalism and tolerance are set aside by the people of 
Russia in favor of flag-waving and patriotism, and yet to label these changes in national 
sentiment “totalitarianism,” “fascism,” or “imperialism” would be a gross 
oversimplification. 
Narrative control, including but not limited to propaganda, is a central concept in 
understanding the nature of Putin’s regime. The Russian people have proven quite 
capable of confiscating power from governing bodies that fail to maintain legitimacy, 
both in 1917 and in 1991. Putin’s ability to pull the strings of state, media, church, and 
business represents the pinnacle of Russian centralization, allowing the president to 
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perpetuate an image of power and moral ascendency regardless of the realities of Russian 
life. Western readers, particularly those who deal in Eurasian affairs, should be equipped 
with an understanding of these tools and their use. Regular incidents involving the 
suppression of Pussy Riot stand in sharp contrast with the positive image of Russia as 
world power and host of the Sochi Olympic games; these opposing forces provide two 
relevant case studies that demonstrate the dual nature of Putin’s control. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Establishing continuity levels between Tsarist, Stalinist, and Putinist Russian 
narratives will require a broad base of literature. This continuity can be divided into four 
themes: the Russian Orthodox Church, the concept of the Great State, Russianness, and 
the leader’s Cult of Personality. For a state to establish a narrative, it must not only 
deliberately propagate the narrative but also suppress opposing viewpoints—censorship 
plays a key role, acting as the final continuous aspect of the Russian narrative. Previous 
literature does not address the narrative in these terms, but rather focuses on propaganda, 
censorship, and nationalism. 
1. Propaganda and Censorship 
A central aspect of narrative manipulation is modern propaganda, first employed 
in pamphlet form by British forces in World War I. Propaganda is a psychological effort 
to persuade (or coerce) through various means of communication, whether by pamphlet, 
book, television episode, or Internet blog. International communications scholar Philip 
M. Taylor presents propaganda as a tool that can be employed in the pursuit of both 
power and military victory. According to Taylor, wartime propaganda is “a weapon of no 
less significance than swords or guns or bombs. But it cannot normally be divorced from 
military realities.”4  In this respect successful propaganda is much like a convincing lie—
it needs to contain enough truth for the recipient to buy into it completely.5 
                                                 
4 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda, Third Edition (New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2003), 5. 
5 Ibid., 3–5. 
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Russian historian Peter Kenez adopts a more encompassing definition: 
“Propaganda is nothing more than the attempt to transmit social and political values in 
the hopes of affecting people’s thinking, emotions, and thereby behavior.”6  Kenez goes 
on to note that propaganda is an inescapable reality of today’s world—whenever a person 
objects to propaganda, the objection is not to the fact that propaganda was employed, so 
much as to either the message conveyed or the means by which it was conveyed. The 
definitions employed by Taylor and Kenez are both relevant when applied to the 
propaganda employed by both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. 
At the other end of narrative manipulation is censorship. Kenez argues that even 
before the October Revolution of 1917, censorship in Russia “was as old as educated 
public opinion.”7 Censorship was pervasive in Tsarist Russia, extending not only to 
political sore spots such as the 1890s famine, but also any derogatory comment at the 
expense of the Turkish Sultan’s wives.8  These practices were haphazard and clumsy in 
the Russian Empire, but they were much more effectively employed by the Soviet Union, 
as evidenced by the successful cover-up of the Great Famine in Soviet Russia and 
Ukraine in the 1930s. Putin’s narrative controls are not a new invention, but represent an 
evolution of practices and ideas from the Soviet Union and the Tsarist Russia. 
Propaganda and censorship play key roles in Russian narrative manipulation, as 
evidenced by state-controlled television. In the words of Stephen Hutchings and Natalia 
Rulyova, Putin employs “his unchallenged authority over the media… to use television as 
a propaganda tool with which to promote his agenda of rebuilding popular belief in a 
militarily strong, self-confident, stable and united Russia.”9 
The Internet is still a very new medium, especially in Russia where it was not 
widespread until after Putin’s rise to power in 1999. For Putin, Internet communication 
represents a powerful new propaganda tool, but also a medium that is very difficult to 
                                                 
6 Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917–1929 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 4. 
7 Ibid., 22. 
8 Ibid., 22–23. 
9 Stephen Hutchings and Natalia Rulyova, Television and Culture in Putin’s Russia: Remote Control 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), 10. 
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effectively censor. The Russian government maintains its own section of YouTube to 
propagate its own agenda and to encourage Russian participation in state-sponsored 
organizations and movements, such as Nashi, a youth movement that encourages social 
activism while painting the West in a negative light. Of course, dissident parties also 
upload their own material, such as Pussy Riot. As YouTube is hosted outside of the 
Russian Federation, there is little the government can do to suppress these videos once 
they have been uploaded.10 
2. Russian Nationalism 
Russian nationalism is one of the central concepts of Russia’s modern narrative, 
but many eminent scholars argue that the people of Russia have never possessed a 
nationality, or at least not one based upon a common culture, but rather a make-shift 
national identity constructed by the state in order to further its own agenda. On the other 
hand, the proper definition of nationalism itself is a point of contention. In 
Ethnonationalism, Walker Connor describes the nation as an “intangible” community 
sharing a “psychological bond,” while the state is simply “the major political subdivision 
of the globe.”11 Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities defines the nation as “an 
imagined political community…both inherently limited and sovereign…always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal companionship.”12 Most telling, however, is Hagen 
Schulze’s description of nationalism in States, Nations and Nationalism: “Nationalism is 
the secular faith of the industrial age. The new state was not sanctioned by god, but by 
the nation.”13 
Geoffrey Hosking’s book, Russia: People and Empire, asserts that the Russian 
people never had a nation so much as an imperialist state. Russification, a Tsarist state-
building tool, was perhaps the closest thing Russia had to nationalism, consisting of three 
                                                 
10 Birgit Beumers, Stephen Hutchings, and Natalia Rulyova, “Introduction,” in The Post-Soviet 
Russian Media: Conflicting Signals, ed. Birgit Beumers, Stephen Hutchings, and Natalia Rulyova (New 
York: Routledge, 2011), 14–17. 
11 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), 92. 
12 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (New York: Verso, 2006), 6–7. 
13 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2004), 158. 
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elements: Russian language, membership in the Orthodox Church, and loyalty to the 
Tsar. Ultimately, Russification was a blunt tool used to convert non-Russians, and failed 
to inspire any real sense of a shared identity among Russians themselves—Russia was 
still defined by its physical borders and not by its people.14 
Martin Malia’s history, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 
1917–1991, describes in some depth the greatest use of Russian nationalism in the 
twentieth century: the Great Patriotic War (or World War II). Stalin employed elements 
of traditional Russian nationalism to bolster the fighting morale of his troops. He did so 
by loosening the government suppression of organized religion, particularly the Russian 
Orthodox Church, and by heaping high praise upon the Russian people, essentially 
placing them at the political center of the Soviet Union.15 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The predicted outcome of the research is a strong continuity between Putin’s 
narrative and those of the Soviet Union and Tsarist Russia. Russia’s own brand of 
nationalism has not changed much since the days of the tsars, with the exception of the 
Soviet era, which saw intermittent suppression of the Orthodox Church. The emphasis on 
being perceived as a great power, on par with the powers of the West, is also nothing 
new. Putin’s image in sympathetic media bears a strong resemblance to Stalin’s cult of 
personality, particularly in the level to which Putin has established control over that 
media. 
The message might be old, but the methods will have certainly changed in many 
respects. The complete control that Stalin enjoyed is impossible to maintain in the 
information age—anyone with a smartphone can upload video to millions or even billions 
of viewers in mere seconds. Modern media allows dissident messages, such as that of 
Pussy Riot, but also works in Putin’s favor, perhaps because he possesses the cunning to 
present a consistent personal image in every situation where he might be seen in public. 
                                                 
14 Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 367, 
397; citation applies to entire paragraph. 
15 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy, A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991 (New York: The 
Free Press, 1996), 286–87. 
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Finally, it is possible that the propaganda employed by Putin’s government will be more 
subtle than Soviet propaganda, primarily because of greater exposure in Russia to the 
liberal ideology of the West. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In a general sense, the thesis compares and contrasts the communication controls 
used by the Russian Federation under Putin with those used by Stalin and the Tsars, with 
an emphasis on propaganda and censorship. Research topics for the first section of each 
chapter will involve Russian and Soviet history, drawing comparisons in the last chapter 
to books and articles about the Russian Federation.   
The second section of each chapter will contain a period case study. Putin’s 
Russia will actually employ two recent case studies: the Pussy Riot band (a dissident 
narrative) and the Sochi Olympics (the mainstream narrative). While the older case 
studies will be drawn primarily from books and articles, the modern case studies will 
entail the perusal of a large number of articles and videos, some of which will be 
propaganda and some of which will be news coverage. There may be some difficulty 
with the credibility of sources—all news carries a certain amount of editorial bias, and 
separating propaganda from objective reporting may prove difficult. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Each chapter will focus on the propagated narrative and censorship in one of three 
distinct regimes of Russia: Tsarism, Stalinism, and Putinism. The narratives will be 
divided into four major themes: the relationship of the state to the Russian Orthodox 
Church (the treatment of other religions plays a role in some cases), the idea of the Great 
State, the concept of Russianness, and the cult of personality around the state leaders. 
Censorship will act as a fifth point of study, providing a final opportunity for comparison 
and contrast between the regimes. Finally, a case study at the end of each chapter will 
show examples of the regime’s propaganda and censorship at work. 
The Tsarist case study will examine the Russo-Japanese war. The Russo-Japanese 
war was a military failure that illustrated the weakness of the propaganda model that 
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Russia employed at the time. The racist portrayal of the Japanese as weak monkeys only 
hurt Russia when the Japanese were successful in warfare. Ultimately, the humiliating 
conflict helped erode the legitimacy of the Tsardom itself, leading to the fall of the 
empire in World War I. 
Collectivization will be at the center of the Stalinist case study. The first Five-
Year Plan resulted in widespread starvation in the farmlands of Soviet Ukraine, Soviet 
Russia, and Soviet Afghanistan. Stalin’s propaganda and censorship were effective in 
suppressing the stories of famine in affected areas, to the point where Western authorities 
largely dismissed reports of the food shortages as rumor and speculation. 
Putinism will contain two linked but contrasting case studies: Pussy Riot and the 
2014 Sochi Olympics. Pussy Riot is a protest band that has borne the brunt of censorship 
employed by Putin’s regime. While Putin has not openly directed any attacks against the 
band, the state has taken significant action against them. Besides the beatings received at 
their Sochi demonstration, Pussy Riot’s members have been detained, harassed, beaten, 
and even imprisoned for “hooliganism.”  Their treatment under Putin’s regime is hardly 
unique. Journalists, environmentalists, political candidates, and other musical artists have 
paid a high toll for dissident viewpoints. 
The 2014 Sochi Olympics will be the second case study. The event stands in stark 
contrast to the Pussy Riot case study, in that it represents the narrative of the current 
Russian state. The “Gateway to the Future” campaign attempted to show a united Russia, 
“a country that is committed to equality and celebrates diversity,” according to the 
summary for one of its advertisements.16  The opening and closing ceremonies connect 
Russia with accessible themes: Love (“Luba”), Russian achievement (with nods to the 
Soviet space program), and Russian culture.17 Russia even allowed gay and lesbian 
athletes to compete, in spite of its own strict internal laws prohibiting non-traditional 
                                                 
16 Igor Vasilevsky, “Sochi 2014 – ‘Gateway To The Future,’” YouTube video, 4 January 2014, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JXdJaZZPqgo. 
17 Video found on Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, accessed 6 September 2014, http://www.olympic.org/
sochi-2014-winter-olympics. 
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sexual orientation.18  The image of a modern, united, moral, and cultured Russian people 
operating within the bounds of an enlightened democracy was the primary message of the 
Sochi Olympics. The contrast between the mainstream and dissident narratives of Russia 
is the primary focus of the second part of the analysis.  
                                                 
18 “Putin Says Gays Welcome at Sochi Winter Olympics,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 
October 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/putin-lgbt-sochi-olympics-gay-homosexual/25150741.html. 
 10 
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II. THE TSARIST RUSSIAN NARRATIVE 
Russia’s national consciousness was born under the Tsars. As Russia expanded 
into new territory in the sixteenth century, Orthodoxy was the primary factor in being 
considered a loyal Russian subject. Over time, other factors coalesced into a loose 
national image of Russia, including the four major themes of this thesis: adherence to 
Russian Orthodoxy, Russia as a Great Power, the idea of Russianness (beyond religion), 
and the evolution of a primitive Cult of Personality around the figure of the Tsar. The 
weaknesses of this national consciousness came to the forefront during and after the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, ultimately contributing to the Russian Revolution. 
A. THE TSARIST NARRATIVE 
Ancient Rus was a poor land for farming, and wholly unsuitable for individual 
farmers, primarily due to the brevity of the harvest season. Its Slavic occupants were a 
tribal people, working collectively with blood relations under a family patriarch. The 
poor quality of the land and the tightly knit farming communities did not encourage the 
emergence of monarchy, but eventually Norman traders brought along their own political 
structures. Their earliest sovereigns were referred to as princes; unlike the Western 
monarchs, however, their political power extended only to the lands they personally 
owned.19 
It was not a tsar, but a grand prince of Kiev who took the first major steps toward 
the tsarist narrative by converting his realm to monotheism. 
1. 988–1917: Orthodoxy under the Tsars 
Vladimir the Great is credited with adopting Eastern Orthodoxy as the state 
religion of Kievan Rus, and consequently the state religion of the Russian Empire and 
Russian Federation as well. The ruler of Kiev decided that his state required a more 
advanced religion than its pagan gods, given the European shift from polytheism to 
monotheism. Vladimir invited ambassadors from the various monotheistic faiths. He 
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turned down Judaism first, arguing, “If God dispersed the Jews in foreign lands because 
of their sins, should we bring a similar destiny on our heads?”20  Vladimir denied Islam 
due in no small part to its rejection of alcohol; the prince remarked, “Drinking…is the joy 
of the Russes, and we cannot exist without that pleasure.”21  The ruler had to choose 
between the two major types of Christianity (Greek and Latin), and dispatched emissaries 
to attend Mass with each faith and report their findings. The reports described the Latin 
ceremony as dull and tedious, while the Greek mass received glowing praise: “In St. 
Sophia Cathedral, it was so beautiful. We did not know whether we were on the earth or 
in Heaven during the service.”22  Hearing this description, Vladimir decided that he and 
the whole of the nation would convert to Greek Orthodoxy.23 
a. The Third Rome 
The Russian Orthodox Church became truly Russian following two other 
formative events: the fall of Constantinople and the collapse of the Golden Horde. Freed 
from any obligation to Byzantium and the Khanate, Russian rulers adopted the title tsar, 
derived from caesar. Ivan IV, of the Riurikid dynasty, formalized the title in 1549, 
styling himself “Tsar of all Russia.”24  This title implied not only imperial sovereignty 
but also authority over all Orthodox Christianity. Moscow was even referred to by some 
as the “Third Rome,” suggesting that the Russian Orthodox Church (and therefore the 
tsar) was the legitimate successor to the authority of Saint Peter over all of 
Christendom.25  The adoption of this title is famously enacted by the eponymous 
protagonist in the Soviet film, Ivan the Terrible, Part I: “Two Romes fell: the third—
Moscow—stands. Never shall there be a fourth.”26 
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With the death of Theodore Ivanovich, the last tsar of the Riurikid dynasty, 
Russia was plunged into a chaotic period known as the Time of Troubles (1598-1613)  
During this period, Russia endured two imposter tsars and an invasion by Poland and 
Sweden. The power struggle ended with the death of the imposters, and the accession of 
Michael Romanov to tsardom. His title of “Great Sovereign” was shared with his father, 
Patriarch Filaret, who ruled Russia in a practical sense until his death in 1634. In 1652, 
the newly anointed Patriarch Nikon also claimed the title of “Great Sovereign,” 
uncontested by Tsar Alexei I, the son of Tsar Michael I. Patriarch Nikon’s political clout 
often rivaled that of the tsar, and eventually he would be condemned and imprisoned by a 
synod of Orthodox officials. The patriarchy had established itself as a political rival to the 
tsardom, and tsars do not suffer rivals.27 
b. The Patriarch of the Sword 
Patriarch Adrian was elected patriarch in 1690; a proud clergyman, he equated his 
word with the authority of Christ: “Whoever… ignores my words, ignores the words… of 
our Lord God.” Tsar Peter I chafed at this political rivalry, and the Anglican and 
Lutheran churches of England and Prussia inspired him to seize closer control of the 
church. Upon the death of the Patriarch Adrian, the tsar did not appoint a successor; in 
1721, Peter abolished the Patriarchate entirely. Instead, he published a document titled 
The Spiritual Regulation, which made the case for absolute patriarchal authority over 
state and church. According to the historian Geoffrey Hosking, “when a gathering of 
bishops requested Peter to allow them to elect another Patriarch, he replied by banging 
the Spiritual Regulation down on the table in front of them and barking out, ‘This is your 
spiritual Patriarch, and those who object to him will (taking a dagger from his pocket) get 
to know the Patriarch of the Sword!’”28  
Under Peter and his successive tsars, the state took control of church property and 
finances. The Russian Orthodox Church lost most of its wealth and political power, and 
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the clergy were largely impoverished. Unlike the reformations of the Church of England, 
however, Peter’s reforms did not involve a major re-working of the faith. Prayer books 
and vernacular Bibles were not made available to the people. More importantly, the 
tsardom still derived its legitimacy from divine mandate, not secular sovereignty. Peter’s 
reforms were effective in removing the patriarch as a potential political rival, but it also 
undermined an institution that provided the tsar with legitimacy.29 
The reforms were a blow from which the Russian Orthodox Church would never 
fully recover. The Church recovered a small amount of power with the defeat of Russia in 
the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905 and the subsequent revolution of 1905, as these 
events forced Tsar Nicholas II to acquiesce to a number of political concessions including 
the establishment of the Duma.30 The Russian Orthodox Church gained a limited political 
voice through its six seats in the State Council.31  The Duma under the tsar held little true 
power, however, and the political bankruptcy of the church was a contributing factor to 
the success of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917.32 
2. Great Russia 
Before the reign of Peter the Great, Russia was defined by tsar and church—in a 
sense, the ruler and the land were one political entity. The bureaucratic underpinnings of 
the empire were inconsistent and understaffed, though they were able to collect enough 
revenue to support the defense of the Russian state, for the most part. Peter the Great 
imported many Western ideas in much-needed reforms to the state bureaucracy, religion, 
and military; in doing so, he helped create the idea of the Great Russian State.33 
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a. Russia under Peter the Great 
Peter’s victories in the Great Northern War with Sweden (1700–1721) provided 
him with the political legitimacy needed to enact changes throughout his empire. Peter’s 
territorial expansion was modest in terms of land mass—the Russian state expanded to 
three times its original size between 1462 and 1689, taking control of much of northern 
Asia. Still, the expansions he executed were ambitious in their own right: a port in the 
Baltics (St. Petersburg) and a port on the Black Sea. Peter conquered Azov in 1696, 
giving him access to the Black Sea, but lost it in 1711 (to be conquered later by Catherine 
II). He acquired Estonia and Livonia from Sweden in 1721, allowing him to create his 
Baltic port. Peter’s military triumphs against modern European powers gave Russia a 
new standing among nations.34 
His reforms redefined the Russian cultural elite, while his victories cemented the 
image of a Great Russia with strong territorial sovereignty. Peter created a secular state 
administration by which motivated servants of the state could advance their social rank 
through service. This concept was codified in the Table of Ranks, based on military 
service, but permitting people from all walks of government service to advance even into 
the nobility. Peter’s reforms also subjugated the church to the empire completely, even 
going so far as to establish a new capital city at St. Petersburg. The new capital was to act 
as a secular seat of power, as Hosking explains: “This was no ‘Third Rome,’ but a ‘New 
Amsterdam.”35 
Peter also pushed the Russian concept of greatness that is traditionally associated 
with military triumphs and territorial expansion. In addition to his military reforms, Peter 
I adopted Saint Alexander Nevsky for use as a great Russian historical figure, ordering 
his remains moved to St. Petersburg, the new, secular capital of the Russian Empire.36  
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Peter also used Nevsky’s successful campaigns against Germans, Swedes, and 
Lithuanians as justification for Russian claims on the Baltic states.37 
b. Victory or Humiliation 
To a large extent, the level of national pride and the perceived “greatness” of the 
Russian state has hinged on military victories since the reign of Peter. Perceived failure, 
on the other hand, deprives Russia of this vital part of its identity, resulting in what 
scholar Astrid Tuminez refers to as “national humiliation.”38  She points to two major 
humiliations under the Tsarist regime: the Crimean War of 1856 and the Russo-Japanese 
War from 1904–1905 (the Russo-Japanese War is particularly instructive in both its pre-
war propaganda and also the post-war consequences of a dismal defeat, to be explored as 
a case study, later in this chapter).39 
Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War was a particularly nasty shock for the empire. 
The future Tsar Alexander II witnessed as Russian serf armies were destroyed by free 
French and British troops. Russian lack of infrastructure, particularly in rail, resulted in 
costly logistical shortfalls. Russia was in no real danger of being conquered, but the war’s 
cost was staggering, bankrupting the state. Upon the death of Tsar Nicholas, Alexander II 
conceded the war in the disadvantageous Treaty of Paris. Russia could no longer claim to 
be the same great power that had defeated Napoleon—its infrastructure was lacking and 
its culture had fallen behind. While advanced European states enjoyed the benefits of 
nationalism, Russia was still an empire running upon the backs of serfs. 
3. Russianness 
Schulze tells us that “Nationalism is the secular faith of the industrial age. The 
new state was not sanctioned by god, but by the nation.”40  Tsarist Russia had certain 
                                                 
37 Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 82. 
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elements of secularism, thanks in no small part to Peter I’s reforms, but the Tsar 
continued to rule by divine mandate, up to the Revolution of 1917. In a sense, Russian 
nationalism had a stunted growth, as ethnic Russians were always Russian subjects, first 
and foremost. 
a. Russian Literature Emerges 
In Imagined Communities, Anderson develops the idea that the “convergence of 
capitalism and print… created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, 
which… set the stage for the modern nation.”41  Under Peter I, the Russian court and 
aristocracy was based on other European models, going so far as to use French and 
German in official court matters. Intellectual discourse, both by written correspondence 
and salon discussion, was patterned on the French Enlightenment. 
The introduction and use of foreign words created linguistic chaos in the Russian 
vernacular. Catherine the Great sought to organize and clarify the language, establishing 
a standard for the population of the state as a whole. The first Russian academy was 
founded in 1783, a clear attempt to formalize the Russian language. By 1794, the first 
official Russian dictionary was produced, with grammar rules to follow in 1802. These 
changes only took place at the peak of Russian society, however—very little if any 
impact was made upon the typical Russian serf.42 
b. Traditional Definitions of Russian Subjects 
The failure of nationalism to take root in Tsarist Russia could readily be attributed 
to policies that placed ethnic Russians at an economic or social disadvantage. Even in the 
eighteenth century, the Russian Empire was host to a broad variety of religious and ethnic 
groups. The state’s early attempts to define and categorize non-Russians made use of 
several factors, including language, religion, geography, and heredity. Nevertheless, there 
was a certain amount of oversimplification. In the article “Ignoble Savages and 
Unfaithful Subjects,” scholar Michael Khodarkovsky explains the terms of distinction: 
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A well-known example is the Slavic word nemets (lit. “one who speaks 
unclearly”), which referred to an outsider, a foreigner in general, before it 
acquired the more specific designation of “German.”  Inzomets (lit. “a 
person of a different land”) referred to either foreigners from Western 
Europe or the natives of Siberia… Two other terms, inodorets (lit. “of a 
different kin”) and inoverets (lit. “of a different faith”), came into usage 
reserved for the non-Christian peoples residing in the newly conquered 
territories in the east and the south.43 
The majority of the Russian populace could not accurately be referred to as 
citizens so much as subjects—Russian serfdom was not abolished until 1861. By 1897, 
the Russian Empire had expanded to such an extent that it contained over 128 million 
subjects; more than half of these, however, were of a non-Russian ethnicity. To make 
discontent among even ethnic Russians worse, non-Russian subjects often received 
special exemptions and considerations from the state. Under these conditions, a stunted 
growth of nationalism could only be expected from the ethnic Russian subjects.44 
c. Pan-Slavism 
Russian pan-Slavism was an irredentist movement, primarily emerging as a 
response to the empire’s humiliating defeat in the Crimean War. At the root of the 
movement was the contention that Slavs were not only superior to their violent Western 
rivals, but also morally ascendant. In his 1869 work Russia and Empire, Nikolai 
Danilevskii argued that the Romano-Germanic period of dominance was decaying from 
wanton materialism and internal corruption, and would soon give way to the righteous 
Slavs: 
These traits of the Russian people’s character show that power holds little 
fascination for us… Russia is almost the only state that never had (and in 
all likelihood never will have) a political revolution—that is, a revolution 
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having the goal of limiting the dimentions of power… and banishing the 
rightful tsarist dynasty and replacing it with something else.45 
Danilevskii went on to claim that the cultural and political achievements of the 
West (“Athens, Alexandria, and Rome”) would merge with the religious ascendency of 
Jerusalem and “Tsargrad,” finding their ultimate combination in the Russian state, as 
“across the broad plains of Slavdom, all these streams must flow into one vast sea.”46  
The tenets of pan-Slavism eventually gained the support of the Russian state, and 
amassed considerable support to the successful Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 
(although it should not be overlooked that Russia took possession of several territories in 
the Caucases, and pan-Slavism was likely a convenient rallying cry, especially as the 
Russian state never officially adopted its policies). Nevertheless, despite its purported ties 
to the common Slav, Russian pan-Slavism did little to establish a real sense of nationality 
among the lower echelons of Russian society.47 
d. Russification 
Russification was a set of practices designed to create ethnic, cultural, and 
linguistic cohesion among subjects of the tsars. Hosking describes Russification under 
Alexander II as an “attempt to inspire among all peoples of the empire a subjective sense 
of belonging to Russia, whether through the habit of using the Russian language, through 
reverence for Russia’s past, its culture and traditions, or through conversion to the 
Orthodox faith.”48  These cultural shifts did not generally supplant one’s original ethnic 
identity, but acted as a supplementary blanket identity.49  The movement ultimately 
backfired—non-Russian groups reacted negatively to the movement, increasing the 
cultural gulf, while Russian subjects remained largely unaffected.50 
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4. Cult of Personality 
No Russian tsar adopted a modern personality cult; while Ivan IV and Peter I took 
great strides to consolidate power, even their considerable authority was considered a 
mandate from the divine. Alexander III and Nicholas II, the penultimate and ultimate 
Romanov tsars (respectively), came close enough to the model of a modern personality 
cult to establish a foundation, providing a model for comparison with later Soviet and 
Russian leaders. 
a. Images and Icons of the Tsar 
Since the reign of Peter I, the Russian court employed French and German 
language and practices. Not surprisingly, the cult of the tsar was at least partially adopted 
from a French ruler. French Emperor Napoleon III had the first modern personality cult, 
based upon popular sovereignty within a secular society, a central father figure, a mass 
following, the mass-production and distribution of the message, and its perpetuation 
within a fairly closed society. His reign was marked by a mixture of spectacle and myth, 
and the emperor was presented to his people as being not only “for the people” through 
his charitable works, but also “of the people” in his marriage to a relatively minor noble 
woman.51 
Tsar Peter I had established a secular state with himself as the paternal center, but 
his reign was never based upon popular sovereignty; nor were the attributes of his 
dominion spread through a mass-produced and uniform propaganda system. More 
importantly, there was a vast gulf between the reigning tsar (especially Peter’s 
successors, who were of generally Germanic and Polish descent) and the Russian serf. It 
was Tsar Alexander III who first attempted to bridge that gap, presenting the image of a 
tsardom that was both Russian and Orthodox. Images of the tsar and his family were 
mass-produced via the press and mass-circulated throughout Russia. In addition to the 
press, the tsar appeared in portraits (including one by Ilya Repin; see Figure 1) and public 
ceremonies. While Alexander neither achieved a true cult of personality nor a meaningful 
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connection with the populace of his empire, the attempt to create such an image was a 
marked move in that direction.52 
 
Figure 1.  Alexander III receiving subjects at Petrovsky Palace, Moscow, by Ilya 
Repin53 
 
b. Tsar Nicholas II 
With Alexander III’s sudden illness and demise in 1894, Nicholas II assumed the 
tsardom. His own quasi-cult of tsardom was distinct from his predecessor in that “he 
sought direct spiritual bonds with the people and greatly expanded the pious, religious 
component introduced by Alexander III,” according to historian Jan Plamper.54  The new 
tsar sought to propagate the image of a direct connection between himself and the divine, 
outside of the confines of Russian Orthodoxy. In particular, the public relationship 
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between the royal family and the mystic Rasputin was highly publicized. For the first 
time, the Russian Empire allowed the visage of Nicholas to not only be displayed, but to 
be featured prominently in print, cinema, plays, and even stamps; see Figure 2. Nicholas 
also sought to publicly discredit his political rivals as enemies of the people, a theme that 
would repeat itself in both the Soviet and post-Soviet regimes.55 
 
Figure 2.  Portrait of Emperor Nicholas II of Russia, painted by Ernest Lipgart, 
and official seven-kopek stamp of Nicholas II56 
This political gambit eventually backfired disastrously, stripping the tsar figure of 
its place above the everyday politics of Russian government. The perception of the tsar 
aligned against the Duma actually helped create a more level political playing field, 
manufacturing true political rivalry where none had previously existed. In essence, 
Nicholas helped weaken his own political legitimacy to the point that it was unable to 
withstand repeated military failure, ultimately leading to the Russian Revolution and 
bringing about the collapse of the Tsarist regime.57 
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5. Censorship 
Censorship regulations in the late 19th century proscribed pre-censorship for most 
publications, exempting only books and selected periodicals. Forbidden topics widely 
varied, from current political matters (such as the 1890s famine) to the reputation of the 
Turkish Sultan’s wives (as previously mentioned). These censorship policies were 
ostensibly put in hand to defend the naïve folk of the Empire from subversive materials. 
Reflecting this justification, scrutiny fell harder on short publications such as leaflets, 
while voluminous books attracted little notice. The lopsided application of censorship 
resulted in some authors deliberately extending their works so that they might be 
published with greater ease.58 
In the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Revolution, the power 
of the state to enforce censorship was greatly diminished. The practice of pre-censorship 
almost disappeared altogether in 1905, and was eventually supplanted by post-publication 
censorship. While a publication could be shut down, or an editor imprisoned (or fined), 
the government could no longer prevent the dissemination of divergent ideas. Instead, the 
censorship apparatus of the state found itself operating in a purely reactive posture.59 
B. CASE STUDY: THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904–1905 
To Tsar Nicholas II, the Russo-Japanese War was supposed to be a mere 
sideshow, an easy victory that would put the Japanese Empire back in its place. Instead, 
the war fully demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Russian Empire’s narrative. The 
Russian Orthodox Church, subjugated to the state since the reign of Peter the Great, had 
little agency beyond accompanying the poorly-disciplined troops in a vain effort to boost 
morale. Russia suffered from a racial superiority complex that led them to underestimate 
a dangerous foe; each defeat at the hand of the Japanese led to fresh feelings of 
humiliation. Russia’s national pride had not yet recovered from the Crimean War, and the 
need to be a great state led the Tsar to take part in a war for which Russia was 
unprepared. Worse, the Tsarist proto-cult of personality surrounded a man who was ill-
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suited for leadership. These factors helped bring about a lopsided conflict, in which 
Japan’s strengths could be brought fully to bear upon Russia’s weaknesses. 
1. Pre-war Narrative: Self-Deception 
The Tsar initially thought to check Japanese expansion. The Russian Empire 
intervened in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria through diplomatic means in 1895, but 
quickly turned around to seize Port Arthur in 1898, angering the Japanese. In 1900, 
Russia invaded Manchuria, with troops erecting Orthodox crosses as a symbol of 
conquest while slaughtering the occupants, including women and children. Count Sergei 
Witte, an influential policy maker for both Nicholas II and his father, writes of the latter 
Tsar’s reaction to complaints from his foreign minister, “His Majesty was gracious to the 
minister, but often interrupted him, saying that, after all, the Asiatics deserved the lesson 
that they had been taught.”60 
As late as 1903, Japanese envoys sought to reconcile with the Russians.61  
Nicholas II wavered on the issue, but was eventually convinced by officials that 
conceding to the Japanese was beneath his empire.62  An indecisive tsar, he was plagued 
by self-doubt and distraught at the burden of leadership; but he believed that God had 
appointed him as the rightful and absolute ruler of Russia.63  At one point he made the 
bold assertion that “there would be no war because he did not wish it,” according to 
scholars Denis and Peggy Warner.64 
In 1904, it should have been clear to Russian authorities that war with Japan was 
inevitable. The Japanese Empire assessed Russian occupation of Korea as a substantial 
security threat; the rational move was to strike Russia hard and fast.65  Tsar Nicholas II 
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was remarkably ill-informed about the threat, referring to the Japanese as monkeys.66  
The foolhardy belief in Slavic superiority over the Asiatic “yellow peril” was evident in 
pre-war propaganda. The Japanese were often portrayed as insignificant, compared to 
huge representatives of the Russian military (see Figures 3 and 4). At one point Nicholas 
made the bold assertion that “there would be no war because he did not wish it,” 
according to scholars Denis and Peggy Warner.67  The Russian military leaned on a sense 
of overwhelming superiority—one could even argue hubris.68 
 
Figure 3.  1904 postcard showing a Russian soldier towering over a Japanese 
puppy69 
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Figure 4.  1904 Russian propaganda poster, large Russian soldier about to eat a 
Japanese soldier for breakfast70 
2. Defeat 
The Japanese brought all of their resources, military and political, to bear against 
their larger adversary at its weakest points. The initial surprise attack on Russian naval 
forces at anchor near Port Arthur inflicted minimal damage, but dealt a major blow to 
Russian morale and kept the small naval force pinned down. Admiral Makarov, the ablest 
commander among the Russian forces, was killed when his ship hit a Russian mine that 
was supposed to have been cleared. The Japanese brought their full force to bear, but the 
best and brightest among the Russian land forces were tied to the European front, 
stationed to deter German aggression. The worst blow came when the Baltic Fleet sailed 
across the world to the Pacific, only to be annihilated by Admiral Togo at the Battle of 
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Tsushima. Unable to bring their full military might to bear and unprepared for the skill of 
their adversary, the Russians faced dismal defeat at the hands of a much smaller enemy.71 
3. Political Fallout, National Humiliation 
The defeat of Russia was a political disaster from which Russia would never 
completely recover. President Theodore Roosevelt presided over peace negotiations, 
which were rather generous to Russia—very little land was given to the Japanese, and 
neither side was compelled to pay indemnities. Nevertheless, the war had placed a 
significant drain on the Russian economy and morale.72 
The humiliating defeat robbed the tsar of a large portion of his legitimacy, 
creating the image of an empire unable to maintain its sovereignty. Toward the end of the 
conflict, protesting crowds were fired upon by the Russian Army in what became known 
as the “Bloody Sunday.”  Nicholas was forced to compromise with his subjects, creating 
a legislative body that, while possessing little political power, was free to publicly voice 
opinions that went against the tsar, and even Russian autocracy.73 
Combined with the weak economy and the weakened political power of the tsar, 
the continued strain of World War I resulted in a complete loss of legitimacy, and the 
ensuing rebellion changed the political landscape of Russia forever. The return of 
Vladimir Lenin was perfectly-timed—he emerged on the political scene just as the Tsarist 
state had reached its breaking point. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The Tsarist narrative (and Tsarism itself) was not an overnight invention. It was 
neither wholly manufactured nor entirely incidental, but rather the result of long-term 
central rule in a state with a stunted sense of national identity, in which the Russian 
people found solidarity in the church and the tsar alone. Following the emasculation of 
the church by Peter I, Tsarist Russia was primarily defined by the tsar—everything else, 
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from Pan-Slavism to military might, from religion to Russification, was and had to be 




III. THE STALINIST RUSSIAN NARRATIVE 
The October Revolution of 1917 was a pivotal moment in history—the Russian 
people, whom Danilevskii had argued would never revolt against their state, had done 
precisely that, permitting the Soviets under Lenin to seize complete power over the 
former Empire. Lenin tried to steer the Soviet Union into a position to trigger a global 
Communist revolution; however, Stalin’s priorities were quite different. Stalin’s primary 
interest was the securing and consolidation of power, and he was not afraid to overturn 
and even reverse many of Lenin’s changes. 
A. THE STALINIST REVERSAL 
Lenin’s revolution began in earnest in 1917. His devotion to Communist ideals 
saw the deconstruction of many aspects of the Russian Narrative, extending beyond the 
demise of the Romanov dynasty. The Russian Orthodox Church, a mainstay of the people 
since 988, was attacked, pilfered, discredited, and banished. The ideas of Great Russia 
and Russianness were exchanged for the Great Soviet Union and Soviet comradeship. In 
keeping with anti-Tsarism, Lenin did not foster his own cult of personality. 
Stalin pulled back or reversed nearly all of these changes. The reasons varied. His 
cult of personality, and even Lenin’s, was a tool to assure near-absolute legitimacy and 
power during his life. In the face of the existential threat presented by the Third Reich, 
Stalin called upon Russia as the backbone of the Soviet Union, using the Russian 
Orthodox Church, Russian military history, and propaganda aimed primarily at Russians 
to help bolster his forces against the existential threat presented by the Third Reich. 
Ultimately, his revolution from above was used to craft a centralized state in which Stalin 
was more of an absolute leader than arguably any tsar had ever been. 
1. Orthodoxy under the Soviet Union 
Orthodoxy was one of the defining characteristics of the Russian empire and 
people before the Revolution of 1917, although the tsars maintained strict control over 
the religious institution as the church was perceived as a potential political rival. Lenin 
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took great pains to ensure that the church would never threaten his new order, bringing 
persecution that would last until Stalin realized the potential of Russian Orthodoxy as a 
nation-building tool under the state. 
a. Enemies of the People 
The Soviet Union was, to a large extent, defined by its enemies: the bourgeoisie, 
tsarists, fascists, and capitalists were denounced; but the state was also belligerently 
atheist. All church lands were nationalized, religious marriage and divorce lacked legal 
status, and religious education was banned.74  In March 1922, Lenin sent a letter to the 
Politburo ordering the seizure of church assets. He cited peasant starvation as justification 
for the confiscation of a massive sum: “a few hundred million (or perhaps even a few 
billion) gold rubles.”75  Orthodox leadership was permitted to operate only after publicly 
swearing their loyalty to the Soviet regime, under Patriarch Tikhon and, upon his death in 
1925, Metropolitan Sergi.76 There would be no patriarch until 1943, when Nazi Germany 
threatened to annihilate the Soviet Union, and Stalin decided that he needed to motivate 
the Russian people by any means possible, including their common faith.77 
b. Nation-Building Tool of the State 
There is nothing coincidental about the oft-criticized ties between the Russian 
Orthodox Church and the KGB, dating back to Stalin’s regime. Soviet persecution of 
religious entities before World War II was rampant until the threat of defeat by Nazi 
Germany made Russian nationalism a necessity for motivating the predominantly 
Russian Red Army. In 1943, Stalin met with leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church to 
grant them more religious freedom, including the election of a new Patriarch. Stalin also 
established the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs, chaired by NKVD general 
Georgi G. Karpov. Metropolitan Sergi was elected the first Patriarch, a likely choice due 
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to his public support of the Soviet Union and continual efforts to bring separatist 
Christian movements under heel. Upon the death of Patriarch Sergi, eight months later, 
Metropolitan Aleksi was elected Patriarch unanimously, with one bishop not present: 
Archbishop Luka objected to the fact that no alternate candidates were on the ballot.78 
Stalin established the expectation that Russian Orthodox priests would cooperate 
fully with the KGB, and membership in the organization often proved quite beneficial to 
their careers. This system of KGB and church collaboration lasted for the life of the 
Soviet Union, and its effects can still be observed in the modern church: Patriarch Alexsi 
II, enthroned in 1990, was originally Aleksi Ridiger, born in Estonia as the multi-ethnic 
son of an Orthodox Priest.79  He studied at the Leningrad Seminary, graduating in 1949 
and entering the “white clergy” of the Russian Orthodox Church.80  “White clergy” are 
allowed to marry but do not rise within the hierarchy of the church. Aleksi married and 
had at least one child.81  He was recruited by the Estonian KGB in 1958; within six 
months of his recruitment, he was made an archpriest.82  In 1961, Aleksi professed 
celibacy and become a member of the “black clergy.”83  At thirty-two years old (the 
earliest age allowed) he was appointed bishop of Tallinn.84  KGB reports revealed after 
the fall of the Soviet Union describe Aleksi as a willing collaborator, “candid and 
sensible but prepared to talk with considerable openness to the KGB and willing to pass 
                                                 
78 Davis, Long Walk to Church, 18–21. 
79 Ibid.,  80–82; John Garrard and Carol Garrard, Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in 
the New Russia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 36–37. 






on unflattering tales about his fellow clerics,” according to expert and U.S. diplomat 
Nathaniel Davis.85 
2. The Great Soviet Union 
Lenin’s Soviet Union supplanted the Russian Empire along with all pretensions of 
Tsarism itself. Service to the Tsar was overturned in favor of the quest to create a global 
Marxist Utopia by building Communism, while the concept of the Great Russian Empire 
was replaced with the Great Soviet Union. Stalin did not alter this portion of the Soviet 
narrative—the legitimacy of the new empire was not entirely based upon military victory 
or territorial expansion, but carried an emphasis on its progressive nature and the 
prosperity of the working class. The Third Reich was a natural enemy, but anti-fascist 
propaganda was suspended during the short peace between Hitler and Stalin. After 
hostilities broke out, the Great Patriotic War would be the focus of Soviet propaganda 
long after the war’s end, and the term “fascist” became a popular way to denounce one’s 
political opponents, a damning accusation even to the present day. The idea that the 
Soviet Union was great because of its military victories and territorial hegemony 
represents a partial return to the mindset of Tsarist Russia, in which greatness was a 
measure of the power and breadth of the empire. 
a. Constructing Communism 
From the early thirties until the outbreak of hostilities with Nazi Germany, 
Stalin’s regime used propaganda to extol the virtues of Soviet advancement and 
leadership. The message was simple: hard-working Soviets were building themselves a 
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better life (and Communism) under strong leadership. The general themes included 
universal literacy, economic prosperity, martial might, technological innovation, and 
industrial ascendancy (propaganda specifically concerning Stalin and Lenin is discussed 
later in the chapter, under Cult of Personality). Broad adult literacy was one of the major 
accomplishments of the Soviet Union, shown in multiple publications (including  
Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.  This Boris Kudoyarov photograph shows Uzbek women learning to 
read, under the pensive eye of Lenin.86 
USSR in Construction was a propaganda journal published from 1930 until 1941, 
returning briefly in 1949 for the celebration of Stalin’s seventieth birthday. It displayed 
not only elements of socialist realism, but also all of the major themes of the Soviet 
narrative. The covers of USSR in Construction show the scientific advancements, 
industrial might, and the prosperous people of the Soviet Union to the world (see Figures 
6 and 7).87 
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87 Ibid., 222. 
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Figure 6.  Covers of USSR in Construction from 1935 (no. 1, “The Maxim Gorky 
Agitational Propaganda Squadron”) and 1934 (no. 6, “Soviet Science”); the 
third image is a 1931 poster advertising the journal.88 
 
Figure 7.  Covers of USSR in Construction in 1940 (no. 1, “The Ferghana 
Canal,” and no. 6, “Soviet Childhood”)89 
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b. Shifting Alliances before the Storm 
In the years leading up to the Second World War, Stalin correctly assessed that 
Germany was the greatest threat to Russia and believed, not without cause, that Britain 
and France were attempting to maneuver Adolf Hitler and Stalin into war with one 
another.90  Thinking that the impending conflict would be similar in nature to the First 
World War, Stalin was determined to avoid hostilities as long as possible while building 
up a strong militarized force.91 There was also an element of expansionism: Stalin 
wished to extend Soviet control to territories in the Baltic states, Bessarabia, Finland, and 
Poland.92  Hitler hoped to invade Poland without Russian opposition and then to wage 
war on Britain and France without any eastern threat.93  The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact 
established non-aggression between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (depicted in 
Figure 8) while secretly providing for the division of other territories between them.94 
 
 
Figure 8.  Left, the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as Stalin watches on; 
right, USSR in Construction’s depiction of a Belorussian male gratefully 
embracing a Red Army soldier as Russia invades and annexes Poland.95 
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The Soviet Union had been producing anti-German propaganda prior to the 
agreement. The Sergei Eisenstein film Alexander Nevsky, first released in 1938, focuses 
on the eponymous prince’s defense of Novgorod against the Teutonic Knights (portrayed 
as Germanic papists, as shown in Figure 9) at the Battle of Lake Peipus, also known as 
the Battle on the Ice.96  The diametric shifts in foreign policy created significant changes 
in Soviet propaganda. For the duration of the pact, the anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist 
campaigns were suspended, including such works as the 1938 film Alexander Nevsky and 
the anti-fascist film Professor Mamlock.97  The term “fascist” disappeared from the 
Soviet vocabulary for approximately twenty-two months.98  The two empires acted as 
partners until 22 June 1941, at which point their cooperation was ended with the advance 
of Wehrmacht tank treads.99 
   
Figure 9.  In Alexander Nevsky, papist German knights invade ancient 
Russia.The clergy is shown as a craven despot traveling in opulence; Teutonic 
headgear bears a blatant resemblance to Wehrmacht helmets.100 
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c. The Fascist Storm Breaks 
Despite receiving warnings of the imminent blitzkrieg, the Soviet Union was 
stunned by the vicious Wehrmacht onslaught on the morning of 22 June—none more so 
than Stalin, who was so traumatized by the betrayal that he could neither take action nor 
assume effective command for two weeks.101 It was Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov who made the first speech concerning the sudden German aggression (and 
restoring “fascist” to the official Soviet vernacular): 
This morning, at four o’clock… without a declaration of war, German 
troops attacked our country… The entire responsibility for this predatory 
onslaught on the Soviet Union falls clearly and unequivocally on the 
German fascist rulers!  The government appeals to all of you, men and 
women, citizens of the Soviet Union, to rally as never before around our 
glorious Bolshevik Party, around the Soviet government, around our great 
leader, Comrade Stalin.102 
Caught off-guard, unable to return fire, incapable of attack or defense, and 
deprived of the centralized command upon which the Red Army now completely relied, 
the Soviet Western front crumbled before the massive German assault.103   Furthermore, 
in accordance with the hastily-developed war plans of 1940, Red Army defenses had 
been concentrated in the southwest, positioned to prevent a German offensive from 
reaching the supply-rich Kiev and Ukraine.104 This prediction of German planning was 
erroneous—the heavily-mechanized Wehrmacht thrust to the northwest was aimed at 
decapitating the Soviet regime by taking Leningrad and Moscow, in addition to the 
Ukraine.105  Stalin’s frantic orders in the initial phase of the war were unrealistic to the 
point of being detrimental: “destruction of the enemy in the shortest possible time and no 
surrender of territory,” according to historian John Erickson.106  He also re-instituted 
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political officers throughout the Red Army, further reducing the efficiency of its 
inexperienced officer corps.107 
By the end of 1941, the Germans had advanced eastward by two hundred miles, 
taken three million Red Army prisoners, destroyed 18,000 Soviet tanks and 20,000 Soviet 
aircraft, besieged Leningrad, and conquered Kiev and the Ukraine.108  By 3 October, 
Hitler publicly announced victory to the German people: “I declare…without any 
reservation that the enemy in the East has been struck down and will never rise again.”109   
This proved to be premature, as the Wehrmacht had ultimately failed to take Leningrad or 
Moscow, and the Red Army was not yet completely vanquished. 
d. The Great Patriotic War 
The start of the war proved disastrous for the Soviet Union, and Stalin found it 
necessary to make several adjustments, reversals even, of policy. An emphasis on 
Russian nationalism replaced the Socialist rhetoric used to inspire Red Army forces, even 
going so far as to name the conflict “The Great Patriotic War.”  Stalin reinstated the 
Russian Orthodox Church, even allowing a new Patriarch to be elected. The infamous 
Order 227 was signed, forbidding any Soviet retreat or surrender on pain of death, 
regardless of the circumstances. Commissar control was relaxed, and Stalin began to take 
the advice offered by his generals, unlike his Nazi rival.110 
Stalin’s greatest shift in terms of propaganda was neither an appeal to Russianness 
nor to the Russian Orthodox Church, but to historical military triumphs of the Russian 
Empire. While the two-year hiatus greatly reduced its effectiveness, the film Alexander 
Nevsky was a successful propaganda film that recalled one of the greatest victories of 
ancient Rus. Stalin also evoked the War of 1812, comparing Hitler to Napoleon 
Bonaparte and even borrowing the older war’s popular title of the “Great Patriotic 
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War.”111 The cinematic display of great Russian leadership continued even after the 
war’s end with Ivan the Terrible. The Eisenstein films about Ivan the Terrible were 
commissioned by Stalin, who saw parallels between the necessary cruelties carried out by 
Stalin and the tsar.112 
Following the Fall of Berlin, the Great Patriotic War became the most celebrated 
victory in the history of the Soviet Union (and remains so today, in Russia). Parades 
marked the victory over Hitler for decades, not only in the Soviet Union but throughout 
the entire Warsaw Pact. Stalin-era films such as The Fall of Berlin and The Battle of 
Stalingrad portrayed the stalwart Soviet defenders, predominantly Russian forces, guided 
through difficult fighting by the masterful hand of Stalin. 
e. Post-War: The Birth of Anti-Americanism 
Toward the end of the war, Allied leadership divided Europe among the three 
allies. Germany was split, with Berlin divided into four sections (under Soviet, American, 
British, and French influence). Territorial lines of influence were drawn between the 
Eastern and Western worlds, setting up the borders for the long Cold War. 
Up until 1939, Soviet propaganda was generally positive toward the United 
States, saving its anger for Germany, Britain, France, and Poland. Eight years later, with 
the United States emerging as the Soviet Union’s primary rival, propaganda began to 
paint the Western superpower as a prime capitalist foe. Stalin even referred to U.S. 
president Harry S. Truman as, “the clerk of American imperialism.”113  From then until 
the 1980s, anti-American propaganda continued to demonize the United States in Soviet 
propaganda.114 
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Figure 10.  A 1952 Yulii Ganf cartoon in Krokodil magazine, “New Techniques 
from Wall Street,” in which an American soldier is launching “plague, typhus, 
and cholera,” while the U.S. Secretary of State (Dean Acheson), and the 
Secretary-General of the UN (Trygve Lie) sing, “the USA does not have 
biological weaponry.”115 
 
3. Russian Nationalism: “Rise Up In Arms, O Russian Folk!”116 
As the Wehrmacht tore its way across the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa, 
morale flagged in the Red Army. Stalin correctly assessed that an appeal to Russian 
nationalism would help bolster the fight against the Third Reich, as Russians made up the 
majority not only the Soviet armed forces, but also the portions of the population offering 
the greatest resistance to the invaders. This pro-Russian trend in Stalinist propaganda 
                                                 
115 Source: King, Red Star over Russia, 336–337. 
116 “Arise, Ye Russian People,” Alexander Nevsky. 
 41 
would last beyond the end of the war, and could be heard in speeches and seen in visual 
propaganda. 
a. Russian Nationalism above All Others 
Stalin was not himself a Russian, but a Georgian by birth. His accent clearly 
marked him as a non-Russian, but on multiple occasions he placed Russians above all 
other ethnicities of the Soviet Union, both privately and publicly. Much of this favoritism 
was intended to help in the fight against Germany; at one point Stalin remarked how “the 
population won’t fight for us Communists, but they will fight for Mother Russia.”117  
Milovan Djilas, then the vice-president of Yugoslavia, met Stalin in 1944 and later 
recorded his impressions: 
I was surprised at his accent. One could tell that he was not a Russian. 
Nevertheless his Russian vocabulary was rich… and replete with Russian 
proverbs and sayings… The conversation began by Stalin asking us about 
our impressions of the Soviet Union. I replied: “We are enthusiastic!”—to 
which he rejoined: “And we are not enthusiastic, though we are doing all 
we can to make things better in Russia.”  It is engraved in my memory that 
Stalin used the term Russia, and not Soviet Union, which meant that he 
was not only inspiring Russian nationalism but was himself inspired by it 
and identified himself with it.118 
The focus on Russian nationalism continued throughout the war. At a toast to Red 
Army commanders in 1945, Stalin extolled the virtues of the Russian people above the 
rest of the Soviet Union: 
I should like to propose a toast to the health of our Soviet people, and in 
the first place, the Russian people. I drink in the first place to the health of 
the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the 
nations forming the Soviet Union… A different people could have said to 
the Government: “You have failed to justify our expectations. Go away. 
We shall install another government which will conclude peace with 
Germany and assure us a quiet life.” The Russian people, however, did not 
take this path because it trusted the correctness of the policy of its 
Government, and it made sacrifices to ensure the rout of Germany. This 
confidence of the Russian people in the Soviet Government proved to be 
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that decisive force which ensured the historic victory over the enemy of 
humanity—over fascism.119 
b. Russian-Themed War Propaganda 
Prior to the war, Stalin’s cult of personality went to great lengths to establish him 
as the father of all Soviet peoples, picturing him with ethnic minorities as often as 
possible (see Figure 11). In the Great Patriotic War (and post-war depictions), however, 
ethnic minorities and even Stalin himself took a backseat to Russians. The shift may not 
have been entirely deliberate, but it is difficult finding ethnic minorities in wartime Soviet 
propaganda. The Russo-centric propaganda represented yet another return to the Tsarist 
narrative.120 
 
Figure 11.  Pictures of Stalin shown with children in Pravda, in keeping with the 
ethnic shift in focus; with a Buriat Mongol girl in 1936, and with a blond 
Russian boy in 1946.121 
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Figure 12.  Soviet war posters: “Red Army Warriors, Save Us!” by Viktor 
Koretsky, and “Fascism—The Most Evil Enemy of Women. Everyone to the 
Struggle Against Fascism!” by Nina Vatolina (who used her Slavic neighbor 
as the model).122 
4. Cult of Personality 
Of all Russian and Soviet leaders, Stalin is the epitome of a modern cult of 
personality. Tsar Nicholas II’s first steps toward building a modern cult of personality 
had ended in utter ruin, and Lenin saw no reason to establish his own. While Lenin’s 
image was certainly not unknown to the Soviet peoples, there is no evidence of a state-
wide attempt to create such a following for Lenin, either in mass media or through the 
use of cult products. It was only after Lenin’s death that his own cult emerged, and 
Stalin’s cult was quick to follow. 
a. The Posthumous Cult of Lenin 
Lenin’s cult was somewhat unusual in that it was posthumous, and it began in 
earnest with Lenin’s own corpse. There was a large public interest in viewing the body, 
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and Felix Dzerzhinsky led a project to preserve the body in order to accommodate the 
people. The preservation and display of Lenin was a controversial subject, even within 
the party. Kliment Voroshilov and Nadezdha Krupskaia, Lenin’s widow, were opposed to 
the idea, wishing to avoid association with the grand burials of the tsars. Eventually those 
in favor of permanently preserving the body fabricated vast public support for the idea, 
and Lenin’s body remains preserved to this day.123 
Lenin’s body was only the beginning. A “death mask” of Lenin, produced by 
sculptor Sergei Merkurov, was used as the basis for fifty-five sculpted works of art, two 
of which were then selected for mass production. Photographs, film, portraits, poetry, 
prose, and other forms of media commemorated the late leader. Places were named for 
Lenin. Testimonials and anecdotes were printed to present the leader in the desired light. 
In one such testimonial, Lenin comes to visit the Obukhov Factory to speak to the 
workers. The story maligns the Mensheviks as “bourgeois lickspittles who grew fat on 
the [Great] War,” and who attempt (unsuccessfully) to prevent Lenin from speaking. Of 
course, Lenin’s speech was successful and moving, and the workers were so touched that 
they lifted Lenin on their shoulders to bring him to his car. The posthumous cult of Lenin 
served as a model for the cult of Stalin.124 
b. The Appearance of Stalin 
The cult of Stalin had a false start in 1929, with the celebration of the leader’s 
50th birthday. Pravda, the most prominent and widely read organ of the party narrative, 
began by publishing telegrams congratulating Stalin on his birthday. On his actual 
birthday of 21 December, the eight-page journal was packed with articles praising the 
leader. There were multiple depictions of Stalin, including a front-page photograph that 
differed from later depictions in a number of ways. Stalin’s hair is parted to one side. His 
gaze is fixed on the camera, and there are visible wrinkles under his eyes. His moustache 
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is noticeably thinner when compared with later photographs and portraits (see Figure 
13).125 
 
Figure 13.  Stalin in Pravda on the celebration of his 50th birthday, 1929.126 
December 1929 was the last celebration of Stalinism for nearly three years. From 
1930 to 1933, depictions of Stalin seemed to vanish almost entirely—this may have been 
an effort to distance the leader from the chaos and strife associated with collectivization, 
according to historian Jan Plamper: 
Between 1930 and mid-1933, Stalin made only rare appearances on the 
pages of Pravda. When he did, he was shown together with other Party 
functionaries and was not marked as outstanding or seen on socialist 
holiday occasions. This hiatus has been attributed to either a deliberate 
attempt to avoid linking the person of Stalin with the upheavals of 
collectivization, or to vestiges of opposition to his single power in the 
Party.127 
In 1933, the cult of Stalin emerged full-force. Stalin’s personality cult was a 
modern one in every sense: he was presented as the secular patriarch of the entire 
population of the Soviet Union, though mass media within a closed society. It has been 
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argued that Russian peasants had always been able to venerate the sacral tsar as a father-
figure, with the primary difference being that Stalin was the head of an atheist state. It is 
relatively clear, however, that the cult of Stalin came not from the people, but from the 
Party. Stalin’s visage was produced on a massive scale, to the point where it was difficult 
to avoid the facsimile of his presence. His appearances in mass media were carefully 
vetted and approved—there still exists a massive paper trail showing Stalin personally 
judging whether or not various articles of propaganda should be published.128 
c. Secular Sovereignty 
Stalin was set apart as the sole secular leader, with unshakeable legitimacy 
derived from popular sovereignty (and succession from Lenin). He was often pictured 
with Lenin, but in modern portraits great care was taken to distinguish him from others. 
When dressed formally or in uniform, Stalin’s uniform was often a different color from 
the rest (see Figures 14 and 15). While others looked at Stalin or one another, Stalin’s 
gaze was calmly fixed on a point beyond the camera, portraying him as a leader with his 
eye on the future of the Soviet Union. The cult of Stalin was carefully framed to avoid the 
appearance of self-aggrandizement—the leader could never be seen to glorify himself, so 
a certain amount of humility was necessary (at least during public appearances). Most 
anecdotes of personal meetings with Stalin describe him as a thoughtful, humble 
individual who never raised his voice. Praise for Stalin always came from around the 
leader, never from the lips of the leader himself.129 
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Figure 14.  A 1934 photograph from Pravda, in which Stalin’s uniform color and 
picture placement set him clearly apart.130 
 
Figure 15.  “Glory to the Great Stalin!”  A 1950 portrait by Iury Kugach, Vasily 
Nechitailo, and Viktor Tsyplakov.131 
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d. Masculinity 
Stalin’s moustache and stout physique were a large part of his public persona and 
masculinity, a constant in all cult products and mass media portraying the leader. The 
placement order within art was also telling. In Russian art, the left symbolized the female 
and the beginning of something, while the right was maleness and the end. Lenin is 
almost universally shown to the left, while Stalin is shown to the right. In some artwork, 
Marx and Engels were placed to the left of Lenin, while Stalin would always appear on 
the far right. Whether Lenin was the originator or the second-to-last “mother” of 
Communism, Stalin was always the final leader and father, deriving absolute authority 




Figure 16.  Pravda depicting the left-to-right progression from Marx to Stalin.133 
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Figure 17.  A 1933 poster by Gustav Klutsis commemorating the 50th anniversary 
of the death of Marx: “Under the Banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin.” 
This banner also displays the left-to-right progression from Marx to Stalin.134 
 
e. Universality 
He often shared his portraits with non-Russians, as the great paternal figure to all 
ethnic minorities as well as Russians, appealing to the entire population. The ethnicities 
of the people around him varied, mostly by regional focus, and always either alone or at 
the center of praise (see Figure 18). Even Stalin’s own image changed to appeal more to a 
target demographic, whether through his wardrobe or by a regional artist’s ethnic 
reinterpretation (see Figure 19).135 
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Figure 18.  Stalin receives flowers on his 60th birthday—the ethnic diversity of 
his adoring populace is on full display in this issue of Pravda, 22 December 
1939.136 
 
Figure 19.  Top left, an Azerbaijan poster of Stalin, with the words “Long Live 
Stalin, the First Marshall of Communism!” Top right, Stalin smoking his 
characteristic pipe at a Central Asian Peoples conference. Bottom, Stalin is 
centrally displayed with Maxim Gorky to the left, and Yiddish writing in 
Hebrew script: “We are the Realization of the Plan.”137 
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f. Media and Cult Products 
Stalin was the subject of continual praise by the Party, receiving accolades from 
various forms of mass media from 1933 until after his death in 1953. His image appeared 
in photographs, paintings (in the socialist-realist style), and sculptures. The leader also 
began to appear in films, portrayed by a select set of actors—initially, his movie stand-in 
was Mikhail Gelovani, a Georgian actor with a noticeable accent who played Stalin in 
more than twenty films, eventually receiving the Stalin Prize.138  Other actors with the 
role of Stalin in that time period include A. Kobaladze, Aleksei Dikii, and Semen 
Gol’shtab (a Jewish actor).139  Of course, the character of Stalin is shown as a stoic 
character with astounding insight into the enemies of the Soviet Union, and adoring 
followers who marvel at his ingenuity (and humility). He is also portrayed as being 
down-to-earth—in his first scene in The Fall of Berlin, Stalin is shown serenely 
wandering a garden before greeting an acclaimed worker in a warm and familiar fashion 
(see Figure 20).140  Even Stalin’s name became a cult product: Soviet workers were told 
to work po-stalinski (Stalin-like), and his name appeared in formations of airplanes, 
athletes, and workers.141 
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Figure 20.  Left, Stalin (portrayed by Mikhail Gelovani) greets a factory worker in 
a garden in The Fall of Berlin; right, the Fedor Shurpin portrait Morning of 
Our Fatherland bears a similar motif, with Stalin standing in a fertile field.142 
g. Closed Society 
The Soviet Union’s borders were closed to all without special permission. John 
Scott, an American writer who spent five years working as a welder in the Magnitogorsk, 
was unable to even bring his Russian wife abroad—the authorities refused to give her a 
passport due to her Soviet citizenship.143  In addition to its closed external borders, the 
Soviet Union restricted internal travel. As early as December 1932, the Soviet Union 
instituted internal passport regulations to prevent hungry peasants in collective farmlands 
from migrating to the city.144  This regulation also served to keep undesirables out of the 
cities—internal passports were restricted to urban workers and wage-earners, while 
peasants, criminals, kulaks (see the case study on Collectivization), and the unemployed 
were driven out of the city.145 
5. Censorship 
Censorship in Russia reached its peak during Stalin’s reign, with new and old 
tools being used to completely control the Soviet narrative. Orders were secretly issued, 
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or merely implied, maintaining an air of mystery about the official stance of the state. 
The regime was so intimately involved with the creation of its narrative that alternates 
were aborted before they began, and dissenters were swiftly silenced. There was little that 
escaped Russia by way of a divergent viewpoint. 
a. Deliberate Obfuscation 
Stalin’s regime deliberately cultivated an air of mystery, sending ambiguous and 
unclear messages that could easily be misinterpreted. This obfuscation allowed the 
regime to benefit from low-level compliance to the most prevalent interpretation of the 
will of the regime, while permitting the state to repudiate the actions of overzealous 
officials at the state’s convenience. In theory, Soviet law and practice in the 1920s 
tolerated religious organizations, permitting church officials to operate more-or-less 
unmolested. In the 1930s, Stalin’s regime quietly (and unofficially) approved of brutal 
tactics to drive out religion, closing churches and arresting priests under secret directives. 
Because these instructions were never officially published, the government was later able 
to deny culpability in the prosecution of the religious. A similar practice could be seen in 
collectivization, when Stalin gently rebuked agents for overly enthusiastic actions (see 
case study).146 
b. Aborting Alternate Narratives 
Ideas that conflicted with the party line were not allowed to exist. Art would be 
routed for approval through one of two Soviet institutions: Glavrepertkom for performing 
arts and Glavlit for text, portraits, and sculpted work. Following institutional approval, art 
was forwarded to Stalin’s secretariat to be approved for production and circulation (two 
separate approval processes, one for production and one for circulation). Stalin’s 
secretary could reject, approve, or recommend changes to the work. Stalin did not often 
bother with written comments for visual art, sticking primarily to text products 
(especially screenplays; see Figure 21).147 
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Stalin’s obsessive interest in the cinema went beyond traditional censorship. Not 
only was the state apparatus was heavily involved in virtually every step of the process, 
but Stalin would often personally take a role in the creative process, making edits and 
suggesting content. Stalin did not seem to think much of a director’s role in filmmaking, 
and he disliked unorthodox or complex camera work, preferring a camera to stay more or 
less at eye-level during filming. While this stifled the creativity of Soviet directors to an 
extent, it also kept the position safe, especially when compared to the numerous 
screenwriters and officials that were condemned to the Gulag for propagating unapproved 
narratives.148 
 
Figure 21.  Left, a portrait of Stalin, with a note from the leader himself: “This ear 
screams that the artist doesn’t know anatomy. J. Stalin. The ear screams, is a gross 
offense against anatomy. J. Stalin.”  Right, an anonymous note on scrap paper handed to 
Alexei Diky, one of the few actors used to portray Stalin in Soviet cinema: “Please tell 
us, have you met with comrade Stalin to prepare for your role?”149 
                                                 
148 Peter Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society: From the Revolution to the Death of Stalin (New York: 
I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2009), 131–33. 
149 Source: Plamper, Stalin Cult, color plate 9, color plate 20. 
 55 
c. Suppression 
Stalin’s regime perpetrated purges of its leadership and military personnel on a 
recurring basis; political rivals and outliers were often accused of spying and subversion, 
regardless of their actual actions. Nevertheless, those that actually propagated alternative 
narratives were quickly neutralized. The Soviet Union employed mock trials and 
tribunals to establish guilt, quickly and efficiently sending the accused to a forced labor 
camp or a shooting squad. After the accused was inevitably found guilty (and was either 
imprisoned or executed), their image might disappear entirely from the public domain, as 
happened to Nikolai Yezhov, former head of the NKVD (see Figure 22).150 
 
Figure 22.  Left, original photograph with Stalin and Yezhov; right, Yezhov is 
airbrushed into non-existence.151 
B. CASE STUDY: COLLECTIVIZATION UNDER STALIN 
Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan displayed the narrative and censorship of Stalin’s 
early regime: militant atheism and a dogged pursuit of Communist ideals, redistributing 
and controlling all agriculture. Its goal was to help modernize the Soviet state, which was 
lagging behind Europe in agriculture, industrialization, and education. The goals were 
simple: to establish state control of all three areas, to shift the focus of labor from 
agriculture to industry, and to create a broad literacy program that would also help bring 
the state closer to its rivals. Eventually, Stalin’s regime would claim victory on all three 
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fronts; collectivization, however, would come at a staggering price in terms of human 
life—a price that was concealed so effectively that even today the death toll estimates 
vary widely.152 
1. The Kulak and the Priest: Liquidating Class Enemies 
Collectivization was a vast step in building Communism in the Soviet Union, and 
it began with the destruction of the “kulak” as a class. Lenin divided a farming village 
into three classes: the lower-class bedniaki, the middle-class (bourgeois) seredniaki, and 
the upper-class kulak (a term derived from the Russian word for “fist”). In theory, kulaks 
were wealthy farmers, guilty of not sharing their wealth with the other, less fortunate 
farmers. In reality, the kulak was normally just a single rung above the other farmers, a 
marginally-successful farmer whose possession of a handful of farm animals and ability 
to hire seasonal workers set him apart from his fellow farmers. Lenin set the kulak apart 
as a class enemy (see Figure 23).153 
During Stalin’s collectivization, the term kulak was broadened to include all 
opposition, readily applied to any farmer with little difficulty. Soviet tribunals designated 
kulaks as they saw fit, with broad freedom to apply the brand to anyone that seemed 
marginally well-off or that opposed collectivization; the kulaks were then deported to the 
Gulag, with their lands and livestock redistributed among the kolkhoz, or collective farm. 
In her book Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance & Survival in the Russian Village After 
Collectivization, Sheila Fitzgerald elaborates on the fickle power of the Soviets: 
Sometimes the names added were chosen arbitrarily, on the basis of 
personal spite or excessive concern about social origin. Many rural 
teachers were added to lists without… due cause. There was a report from 
the Urals that activists in a rural factory settlement had dekulakized an old 
man who had been a village policemen [sic] in Tsarist times, despite the 
fact that he had “no land, no horse, [and] no cow.154 
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Figure 23.  Left, a 1930 poster, “Bash the Kulak off the Kolkhoz.” Right, a worker 
demonstration on a collective farm, carrying a banner that reads, “Liquidate 
the Kulaks as a Class.”155 
Stalin took advantage of the collectivization to rid himself of another class enemy, 
the village priest. As Soviets were carrying out the work of redistributing farm assets to 
the kolkhozes, the village churches were being shut down, with the priest removed. The 
belligerent atheism initially began by Lenin continued to be implemented under Stalin, up 
until he called upon their assistance in the Great Patriotic War. Historian Martin Malia 
describes the first part of collectivization: 
Before the collectivization drive most kolkhozes were TOZs. Once the 
drive began, Party activists aimed for the artel, and even beyond it for the 
commune, collectivizing cows, pigs, chickens, the peasants’ garden plots, 
and even household implements. At the same time, the village church was 
closed, its bell taken down, and the priest chased off. The immemorial 
way of life of peasant Russia was shattered with one blow. Needless to 
say, this operation was no longer a Plan.  “Plan,” along with “liquidation 
of the kulak,” was now only a battle cry in the Party’s storming of the 
traditional Russian village.156 
The initial push went too far, too quickly. The regime had stolen away their 
salvation, and now threatened their possessions in the mortal realm. Livestock was the 
most precious asset that a peasant farmer might possess, and farmers began defending 
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their livestock from confiscation in the only way they knew: slaughter. During the initial 
push, an estimated four million horses and fourteen million heads of cattle were 
butchered before they could be taken. Exaggerated reports were released that over half of 
Russian agriculture had been collectivized, but half of the new kolkhozes existed only on 
paper. Rapid collectivization was driving the Soviet Union toward agricultural 
calamity.157 
There was also cause for alarm on the Soviet Union’s Western border. Rather than 
stabilize the border with Poland, the policy destabilized it; the forced transition to 
collective farming motivated droves of Ukrainians to abandon their homes and migrate 
west. Stalin was concerned that Poland and Japan might align against the Soviet Union, 
with the Japanese Empire backing a Polish invasion. These fears were based on a very 
real threat: communication between the two powers had been discovered by Soviet 
agents.158 
2. “Dizzy With Success” 
Stalin saw the destabilization of Ukraine with great concern, and called for a 
temporary halt to the Five-Year Plan, in an article entitled, “Dizzy With Success.”  He 
claimed that collectivization had been a rousing success, and even admitted that some 
agents might have been overly zealous with regards to their mission. The collectivization 
achieved in Soviet Ukraine was reversed, for the most part, and the peasant farmers 
believed that somehow they had won. They would soon discover that this belief was 
wrong.159 
Stalin began collectivization anew, but this time he worked in a slower and more 
insidious manner. He began by raising taxes on the independent farmer, economically 
coercing them to join collectives. He granted considerable authority to the farmers in the 
collectives over the independent hold-outs, giving them the power to confiscate seed 
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grain. Deportations continued, and peasants had a simple choice: starvation at home or 
incarceration in the Gulag. This time, farmer resistance crumbled before the onslaught of 
the Soviet system, and by the end of 1931 approximately seventy percent of the Soviet 
Ukraine’s farm land was collectivized.160 
In order to faster meet the goals of the Five-Year Plan, officials were ordered to 
confiscate all food until the high harvest quotas were met—including the precious seed 
grain. A poor harvest of 1932 resulted in mass starvation, but the Soviet policy was 
intractable. Orders were issued to prevent the peasants from relocating, and city borders 
were closed to prevent begging. The regime passed a law in the same year, making the 
possession of any food into evidence of withholding food, a punishable crime. Stalin 
interpreted even the starvation of the peasantry as an act of rebellion.161 
3. Internal Censorship 
Stalin’s regime did its best to curtail knowledge of the famine, primarily through 
controlling the movement of peasants. Border guards were increased to prevent peasants 
from leaving their kolkhozes. The state blamed Ukrainian and Polish nationalists for the 
famine in Ukraine, and the Ukrainian security chief, Vsevolod Balytskyi, oversaw the 
deportation of thousands of so-called Ukrainian and Polish conspirators, accusing them of 
sabotaging the grain supply to incite rebellion. City residents were required to carry 
internal passports, so that farmers could not come to beg. Stalin even denied long-
distance tickets to the peasantry, essentially giving them a death sentence in a land now 
bereft of food, save the crops eagerly snatched away by the state.162 
Though he insisted that the famine was staged as an attack upon the state, the 
evidence suggests that Stalin was well-aware of the actual plight of the farmers. Party 
officials privately estimated the death toll to be around 5.5 million in 1933. Four years 
later, in 1937, census-takers determined the total damage of the famine within Soviet 
Russia, Soviet Ukraine, and Soviet Kazakhstan. While the exact number of losses is still 
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a matter of debate today, the Soviet demographers reported that the population of the 
Soviet Union was approximately eight-million below the estimated number that it should 
have been, mostly due to the widespread starvation from collectivization. Stalin reviewed 
their report, which he promptly buried before having the demographers executed.163 
4. External Counter-Propaganda 
Over time, rumors of the great famine in the Soviet Union began to reach the 
west. Western reporters snuck through the borders, returning to their home countries with 
appalling stories of conditions in the Soviet territories. Stalin’s regime took measures to 
actively discredit these rumors. Edouard Herriot, a French politician, was invited to tour 
the Ukraine and see the conditions in Kiev. The visit was entirely staged. Healthy 
children were gathered and coached on what to tell the official. Food and goods were 
placed in shop windows, and automobiles were driven in from a vast radius to create the 
illusion of a bustling, prosperous city. Sufficiently impressed, Herriot reported to the 
West that Ukraine was prospering under Soviet rule. Timothy Snyder describes the 
occasion:164 
The food was on display, not for sale, for the eyes of a single foreigner… 
Herriot was driven down Kiev’s incomparable avenue, Khreshchatyk. It 
pulsed with the traffic of automobiles… On 39 August 1933, Herriot 
visited the Felix Dzierzynski Children’s Commune in Kharkiv… What, 
the Frenchman asked, had the children eaten for lunch?... The children had 
been prepared for this question, and gave a suitable answer. Herriot 
believed what he saw and heard. He journeyed onward to Moscow, where 
he was fed caviar in a palace. The collective farms of Soviet Ukraine, 
Herriot told the French upon his return, were well-ordered guardens… The 
story was over.165 
C. CONCLUSION 
Stalin established a control over the Soviet Union’s narrative that remains 
unrivaled to this day, taking the most successful (and oppressive) measures of Tsarism 
and Leninism to create his own system. Part of this adaptation was a shift in response to 
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Hitler’s invasion—the Great Patriotic War ultimately helped Stalin not only tighten his 
controls over the Soviet Union, but expand his territorial influence immensely. His tactics 
would prove instructive to future Soviet and Russian leaders, even if not all of them 
would be as successful in the age of wireless communication.   
 62 
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IV. THE PUTINIST RUSSIAN NARRATIVE 
President Vladimir Putin has incorporated pieces of Tsarism and Stalinism almost 
seamlessly to build a state that has supported him through a difficult sixteen years. In the 
midst of NATO expansion, terrorist attacks, and internal protest he has managed to 
maintain a high approval rating, despite the new obstacles to his authoritarian rule in the 
twenty-first century. 
A. THE PUTINIST NARRATIVE 
The Kremlin has come into its own in the art of mass media manipulation in the 
twenty-first century, combining traditional Tsarist concepts such as Orthodoxy and Pan-
Slavism with many of Stalin’s tools, including a quasi-cult of personality and a variation 
on Stalinist censorship. 
1. The Influence of Russian Orthodoxy 
For the most part, the current relationship between the Russian Federation and the 
Russian Orthodox Church represents a continuation of elements from both its Soviet and 
Tsarist predecessors. The church has benefitted tremendously from the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union—Russian Orthodoxy has become the state religion in all but name. The 
relationship between church and state is mutually beneficial in this case. Russian 
Orthodoxy lends aspects of nationalist legitimacy to the state and its actions, while the 
state ensures that other forms of Christianity are marginalized within Russia. 
a. The Role of the Church in Russia 
The Russian Orthodox Church today has a symbiotic relationship with Putin’s 
regime. Estimates place Orthodox believers at over three-quarters of the Russian 
population, with the caveat that less than ten percent are regular practitioners.166 The 
church lends legitimacy to the state, the president, and elections; not only are priests 
among those used to monitor voting booths, but “a leading Russian politician positions 
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himself by sponsoring a pilgrimage, and making religious donations,” according to 
experts John and Carol Garrard.167 
Even today, the top echelons of the Russian Orthodox clergy have, at the very 
least, former ties to Soviet intelligence. KGB reports revealed after the fall of the Soviet 
Union describe Patriarch Aleksi II as a willing collaborator, “candid and sensible but 
prepared to talk with considerable openness to the KGB and willing to pass on 
unflattering tales about his fellow clerics,” according to expert and U.S. diplomat 
Nathaniel Davis.168 Upon Aleksi’s death in 2008, he was succeeded by Metropolitan 
Kirill, another alleged KGB collaborator under the Soviet Union.169 
Under the leadership of Aleksi II, the Russian Orthodox Church further expanded 
its authority, reuniting with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia.170  This 
reunification was made possible through several actions taken under Aleksi II: the 
canonization of the Romanovs, church acknowledgement of Soviet abuses, and the 
acknowledgement that Patriarch Sergi’s collaboration with the Soviet Union was 
forced.171 President Vladimir Putin played a major role in hosting and endorsing these 
negotiations.172 Patriarch Aleksi II died in 2008 and was succeeded by Metropolitan 
Kirill, who was allegedly also a KGB collaborator under the Soviet Union.173 
There can be little argument that the Russian Orthodox Church holds great 
political clout in the Russian Federation. Estimates place Orthodox believers at over 
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three-quarters of the Russian population, with the caveat that less than ten percent are 
regular practitioners.174  The church lends legitimacy to the state, the president, and 
elections; not only are priests among those used to monitor voting booths, but “a leading 
Russian politician positions himself by sponsoring a pilgrimage, and making religious 
donations,” according to experts John and Carol Garrard.175 Russian leaders such as 
President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev attend masses openly and regularly, as 
seen in pictures of Christmas masses from 2014 (including Figure 24). 
 
Figure 24.  President Putin and Prime Minister Medvedev attending Christmas 
masses in 2014176 
b. Non-Orthodox Christianity 
Non-Orthodox Christians, including Roman Catholics and Protestants, are 
technically allowed in Russia.177  These religious minorities are viewed as non-Russian, 
Western religions, or as one Russian Orthodox official remarked, “from the West’s 
money.”178  While not allowed to proselytize, the private religious freedoms of these 
groups are protected in theory; in practice, however, Orthodox officials see to it that they 
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are denied the opportunity to acquire meeting spaces or property in which to worship 
openly.179  While the federal government takes no active role in persecuting Christian 
minorities, local officials are more easily swayed by Russian Orthodoxy.180  Other 
religious minorities (including atheists) find themselves treated in a similar manner.181  
The U.S. State Department International Religious Freedom Report for 2014 reported: 
Government authorities detained and imprisoned members of minority religions... 
Police conducted raids against the private homes and places of worship of minority 
religious groups disrupting religious services and confiscating religious publications they 
deemed to be “extremist.” Authorities acted to dissolve some minority religious groups or 
revoke their status, refused to register other religious organizations, and imposed a 
number of restrictions that infringed on the religious practices of minority religious 
groups, in particular Muslims, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pentecostals, and Scientologists, 
including limiting their ability to obtain land, build places of worship, and obtain 
restitution of property seized during the Soviet era.182 
2. Great Russia 
The new Russian Federation was born through grievous injuries to its collective 
ego. For good or for ill, Tsarist Russia had defined itself through its (supposed) religious 
uniformity, territorial expansion, and military prowess. By contrast, the Soviet Union’s 
self-image had been based upon the strength of its civic institutions under Communism, 
and its victory over Fascism in the Great Patriotic War. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
simultaneously deprived Russia of the ability to take pride in most of these areas. The 
Soviet Union had been forced to ignominiously retreat from Afghanistan, and the 
successive Russian state was not only deprived of much Soviet territory but also 
humiliated in the first Chechen War. Communism had failed, and Russian prestige was at 
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its lowest point in decades. Vladimir Putin needed to re-establish the Great Russian 
State—and he did it, by cobbling together the pieces that were already there. 
a. Soviet Legacy 
While the Soviet Union defined itself by more than Russia, the Russian 
Federation was the nearest thing to a favored child and heir. After the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, Russia still had the largest land mass of any state in the world, and there 
were those who believe that Russia deserves to be a leading global power.183  In a 
military sense, most of the Soviet Union’s forces were passed down to Russia, including 
the considerable Soviet nuclear arsenal.184  Russia also inherited the Soviet space 
program and the glory of victory over the Third Reich in the Great Patriotic War. These 
accomplishments help fuel Russia’s great power status, but borrowed glories can only go 
so far, especially when dealing with a triumphant NATO (and United States, in 
particular) that claims victory in the Cold War while seeming to slowly spread its 
influence eastward. 
b. NATO Expansion and Russian Insecurity 
The Soviet Union viewed NATO as an adversary, which was not far from the 
truth, as its primary purpose in the Cold War was common defense under Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty.185  Indeed, many Soviet scholars believed that NATO would dissolve 
naturally upon the end of the Cold War.186 In 1990, some Americans and Russians hold 
that “the United States pledged never to expand NATO eastward if Moscow would agree 
to the unification of Germany,” in the words of former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara.187 On the other hand, U.S. leaders involved in the decision-making process, 
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such as former President George H. W. Bush and his Secretary of State James A. Baker, 
flatly deny that the curtailing of NATO was ever mentioned in negotiations.188 All 
available documentation from either side supports Bush’s assertion that such a deal was 
neither offered nor agreed upon.189 
Russian officials have consistently accused NATO of violating this alleged 
pledge, especially during its expansions since 1990. In 1999, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland joined NATO against Russia’s objections.190 In 2001 and 2002, 
controversy flared up when the Vilnius group, consisting of several countries including 
the Baltic States, attempted to join NATO—most of them would become NATO 
members in 2004.191 Albania and Croatia’s entry in 2009 and the possibility of NATO 
membership for Georgia and Ukraine are likewise viewed as provocative and a threat 
against Russian national security.192 
Another major landmark in NATO-Russia relations is NATO’s 1999 intervention 
in Kosovo. There was no UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate for the NATO action, 
but NATO was compelled to occupy the territory due to the continuous acts of brutal 
ethnic cleansing and human rights violations in the area.193 Russia voiced strong 
opposition, claiming that the actions taken “against Yugoslavia not only constituted a 
violation of the UN Charter but also that it contravened the NATO treaty,” in the words 
of German scholars Hannes Adomeit and Frank Kupferschmidt.194 It should be noted 
that, in proceeding without a UN mandate, NATO had effectively denied Russia the 
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ability to employ its veto power as a permanent member of the UNSC. In 2008, when 
Russia invaded Georgia to, ostensibly, liberate Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the 
precedent set by the Allied invasion of Kosovo was used to justify the action.195  Timing 
is everything, and the conflict with Russia played a major factor in NATO’s decision not 
to extend a Membership Action Plan to Georgia.196 
The idea of taking its place as a purely regional power or as a secondary partner in 
any alliance is distasteful and demeaning, given Russia’s status as one of “the world’s 
leading powers,” according to President Putin.197 His February 2007 speech in Munich 
makes Putin’s stance transparent, objecting vehemently to NATO expansion as a “serious 
provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”198 Putin cites an alleged 1990 
agreement to keep NATO from expanding beyond Germany and, further, complains of 
NATO placing military fortifications and units on Russia’s borders.199  Putin accuses the 
United States of unilateralism and an attempt to create a “unipolar world,” inferring 
hypocrisy in Western politics: “We are constantly being taught about democracy, but for 
some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.”200  Putin does have a 
few positive comments about the West, including praise for the joint effort with Russia’s 
“American friends” in the “non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”201 
c. Frozen Conflicts 
Russia maintains an adversarial attitude towards NATO, taking action whenever 
possible to ensure that former Soviet states do not join. The 2008 invasion and 
subsequent partition of Georgia was a heavy-handed and successful attempt to keep 
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Georgia from joining NATO. The 2014 annexation of Crimea is one of many threats 
previously made against Ukraine in the event that it joined NATO; at one point Putin 
inferred that were Ukraine to enter the alliance, Russia would “be forced to target its 
nuclear offensive systems at Ukraine,” in self-defense.202 Moldavia has also felt the grip 
of Russian hegemony while trying to deal with the separatist Transnistria movement—
Russia prevents NATO from any peacekeeping involvement in the area while supporting 
the separation with Russian armed forces as a “stability factor” in the region.203 
3. Russianness 
Even today, Russians have a somewhat stunted sense of nationalism. Language 
and ethnic heritage play a role, as does patriotism and pan-Slavism, but the Russian 
people have endured two major revolutions in the past century: the October Revolution of 
1917, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Most of today’s Russians grew up 
under the Soviet system, under which Russian nationalism was more a matter of Soviet 
citizenship than a solid cultural identity. 
a. Russian Pluralism and Morality 
In theory, Russia is a civic nation-state that welcomes all cultures and religions. 
There are, however, strict controls in place to ensure that Orthodoxy remains the 
dominant Christian religion (as previously mentioned). While many areas of Russia are 
diverse, not all Russians are accepting of other perceived cultures. A 2009 study 
involving the survey of 2,455 middle school students in 39 different Russian schools 
found a significant amount of xenophobia. According to Ekaterina Dobrynina, a majority 
of Russian students supported six of thirteen intolerant statements: 
Six statements were approved by the majority of those asked, for 
example… that some of the ethnic groups in Russia are “backward and 
undeveloped,” that there are peoples whose presence in Russia must be 
restricted and “harmful nationalities,” that “the most important religion in 
Russian should be Russian orthodoxy,” and others. And it is small comfort 
that “only” less than half of the young people believe that barriers must be 
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established to allowing “people of some nationalities” into power and that 
“only Russian people can be patriots of Russia,” and so forth.204 
Orthodox Church leaders vocally support conservative Russian values, but the 
state is also careful to foster a strict moral code in line with Orthodoxy. In a 2000 
interview, Putin argued the importance of “moral values,” and added that Russians “will 
fight to keep our geographical and spiritual position.”205  In 2013, Putin attacked the 
West’s “non-traditional values” in his annual state of the nation address: “This 
destruction of traditional values from above not only entails negative consequences for 
society, but is also inherently anti-democratic because it is based on an abstract notion 
and runs counter to the will of the majority of people.”206 
b. Russian Nationalism 
The Russian Federation has returned to certain elements of Russian nationalism 
and irredentism, particularly in the past few years. The majority of Russia’s frozen 
conflicts were justified as protecting ethnic Russians outside of Russia, including the 
annexation of Ukraine. Despite claims to the contrary, there is significant photographic 
and anecdotal evidence of Russia’s significant support of the Ukrainian rebels in the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Putin has claimed on multiple occasions that these Russian 
service members are not fighting with the rebels on orders, but have taken leave to 
volunteer, as their individual consciences dictate.207 
4. Cult of Personality 
Putin enjoys strong approval ratings at home and is a respected leader around the 
world; indeed, his approval has skyrocketed in conflicts with the West, particularly the 
                                                 
204 Ekaterina Donrynina, “A ‘C’ Grade in Tolerance,” Russian Social Science Review, vol. 50, no. 5 
(September–October 2009), 40 33–47. 
205 Vladimir Putin, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait By Russia’s President, trans. 
Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (New York: PublicAffairs, 2000), 169. 
206 Damien McElroy, “Vladimir Putin Claims Russia is Moral Compass of the World,” The 
Telegraph, 12 December 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10513330/
Vladimir-Putin-claims-Russia-is-moral-compass-of-the-world.html. 
207 “NATO Chief Accuses Russia of ‘Direct’ Military Involvement in Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty (website), 29 August 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-nato-/26555896.html. 
 72 
Crimean annexation, the Ukrainian conflict, and other recent disputes. His following also 
has many of the aspects of a modern cult of personality: a masculine, secular sovereign 
with the support of the people, using mass media and cult products to foster a positive 
image. The last piece of modern cults of personality is for the society to be isolated from 
the rest of the world, and Russia is ostensibly an open society. Even this, however, has 
been used to strengthen the power of its narrative. 
a. Secular Sovereignty 
As with most modern heads of state, Putin must at least maintain the ability to 
claim election through democratic means. As President of the Russian Federation, he was 
elected three times (in 2000, 2004, and 2012). The Russian constitution forbids one from 
serving in more than two consecutive terms, so Prime Minister Sergei Medvedev ran for 
and was elected president in 2008, and immediately appointed Putin as prime minister. 
Putin’s first election, in 2000, was mired in accusations of voting fraud. The previous 
president, Boris Yeltsin, has resigned the office to Putin on 31 December 1999, making 
Putin the incumbent. News stations such as Public Russian Television and Russian 
Television and Radio were quick to show positive stories about the sitting president, 
while oligarchs moved to back the obvious front-runner. Still, Putin barely received over 
half of the popular votes in the first round, amid accusations of vote-stealing from his 
rivals.208 
Putin’s political party plays a major role in his continued electoral successes. In 
2001, Putin’s team worked to merge the Unity party with three other major factions, 
forming a dominant party known as United Russia. The new party would hold an easy 
majority, allowing its members to dominate the parliament and consistently control the 
outcome of the presidential elections. Moreover, laws were passed to ensure that smaller 
parties would never have the opportunity to gain power—any political party must have 
over 40,000 members, with branches in at least half of Russia’s twelve regions. The new 
legislation ensured that the number of competing political parties dramatically dropped, 
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from over forty registered parties in 2003 to only fourteen parties in 2008, as smaller 
parties found themselves unable to qualify. While Putin has never officially joined United 
Russia, the party has consistently worked to back the president.209 
Putin is a secular authority, but enjoys a sacral status approaching that of a 
modern tsar. The Russian government has taken steps to improve relations with the 
Russian Orthodox Church since the collapse of the Soviet Union, culminating in the 
invitation of Patriarch Kirill to reside at the Kremlin in 2011.210 In turn, Kirill praised the 
then-prime minister, calling Putin a “miracle of God,” who “personally played a massive 
role in correcting this crooked twist of our history.”211 Putin received similar support 
from Jewish and Muslim leaders in the 2012 election, securing religious support from 
every mainstream Russian religion.212 This close tie between church and state soon led to 
the Pussy Riot scandal (the second case study of this chapter). 
b. Masculinity 
Putin’s masculinity provides the bedrock to his public persona, with events 
regularly filmed (and staged) to show the leader as a man of action. His involvement with 
Judo is well-documented (see Figure 25). Not only is he the author of his own book on 
Judo (Judo: History, Theory, Practice), but he holds a fifth-dan black belt in Judo in 
addition to an honorary eighth-degree black belt in Kyokushin-kan karate and an 
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honorary ninth-degree black belt in Tae-kwon-do (giving him the title of “grand master” 
and placing him in a rank above renowned martial artist Chuck Norris).213 
 
Figure 25.  Putin’s Judo, as seen on the cover of his book, Judo: History, Theory, 
Practice, and in a December 2009 training session in St. Petersburg.214 
In First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self-Portrait by Russia’s President, 
Putin describes himself as a “hooligan” in his youth, claiming, “It was sports that dragged 
me off the streets.”215  Martial arts are only the beginning of his machismo—the Russian 
leader’s holidays are often opportunities to show off his physique and prowess. His 
publicized activities are extensive, including target practice, motorcycle-riding, racecar-
driving, swimming (in frigid Siberian lakes), fishing, hunting (lethal and non-lethal, 
hunting everything from bears and tigers to whales), diving (via SCUBA or submersible), 
                                                 
213 “Judo: History, Theory, Practice,” Amazon.com, last accessed 2 January 2016, 
http://www.amazon.com/Judo-History-Practice-Vladimir-Putin/dp/1556434456/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie= 
UTF8&qid=1451717368&sr=1-3; Cheryl K. Chumley, “Vladimir Putin Earns 8th-degree Black Belt in 
Karate,” The Washington Times, 25 November 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 2014/nov/
25/vladimir-putin-earns-8th-degree-black-belt-in-kara/; Ryan Craggs, “Vladimir Putin Earns 9th Degree 
Black Belt In Taekwondo, Because That’s What Vladimir Putin Does,” The Huffington Post, 13 November 
2013, “http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/13/putin-black-belt_n_ 4269536.html. 
214 Source: “Judo: History, Theory, Practice,” Amazon.com; Ryan Craggs, “Vladimir Putin Earns 9th 
Degree Black Belt.” 
215 Putin, First Person, 18, 19. 
 75 
hang-gliding, hiking, figure-skating, ice hockey, firefighting, bottle-feeding elk, and 
playing the piano.216 
Many of these activities are clearly staged for publicity. A highly-publicized 
SCUBA diving expedition was reported successful when Putin surfaced with two Greek 
amphorae. The pro-Kremlin RT (originally Russia Today) news website was quick to 
praise the leader: “The PM put on a diving suit and dived deep into the Taman Bay 
where, to everyone’s utter surprise, he managed to find two ancient amphorae dating 
back to the 6th century AD.”217  Other media outlets soon questioned the lack of moss on 
the artifacts, and it was later disclosed that the amphorae had deliberately been placed for 
Putin to discover them.218 Putin also admitted in a news interview that some of the events 
with endangered species were staged, complaining about the somewhat fallacious 
exposure: “Of course, there are excesses. And I’m annoyed about it.”219 
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Figure 26.  Putin on holiday (cropped photographs). Left, Putin “managed to find” 
two ancient amphorae that had been staged for a photo opportunity; right, Putin hiking 
shirtless in Siberia.220 
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c. Universality 
Unlike Stalin, Putin’s image remains a Russian one, though he generally avoids 
making statements that will offend Russian minorities, and he regularly meets with non-
Christian religious community leaders. Russia officially recognizes four Russian 
religions: Christianity (Orthodoxy), Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism.222 While mass media 
is not flooded with photographs of Putin interacting with non-Orthodox religious figures, 
the meetings are a regular enough occurrence that such photographs are relatively easy to 
find (see Figures 28 and 29). 
 
Figure 28.  Putin meets with Muftis of Russia’s Muslim Spiritual 
Administrations223 
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Figure 29.  Putin visits a Buddhist monastery in Buryatia224 
d. Media and Cult Products 
The cult of Putin is unique in that it seems to come from above and from below. 
Propaganda praising the leader began while he was the interim president before the 2000 
elections, with constant positive television coverage and his autobiographical book. By 
2001, however, Putin began appearing in locally-produced paraphernalia. Vendors began 
stocking portraits, figures, and other gear depicting the president, not because of state 
production, but market demand. For lack of a better word, President Putin was cool—a 
world leader with a pop culture following. In 2002, an all-female musical group released 
a radio hit entitled, “A Man Like Putin,” which ended up on the Russian Top 10 for four 
months.225  Fan clubs sprung up around the leader. His name was used without 
permission for products ranging from Putinka vodka to “Puin” canned goods (with the 
state symbol placed between the “u” and “i,” to act as the “t”). Putin’s celebrity status 
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meshes well with the existing state narrative—Putin’s massive approval and popularity is 
no great surprise.226 
e. Open Society 
Russia does not have closed borders. On the contrary, Russia trades openly with 
the rest of the world, and Russians are free to travel the globe—an estimated ten million 
Russians engage in tourism every year. This flies in the face of the final requirement for a 
modern personality cult—the states of the twentieth-century cults had closed borders to 
prevent its citizenry from realizing that they had been duped. It could be argued, 
however, that this mutation strengthens the cult, rather than weakening it. Under the 
Tsarist and Stalinist regimes, a Russian facing oppression had two options: submit or 
rebel. Putin’s regime provides another alternative, in the form of an exit. Those that are 
dissatisfied with the economy or the regime may simply leave Russia, thereby reducing 
the numbers of the dissidents and weakening those that stay to attempt change. In his 
article “Paradoxes of the New Authoritarianism,” Ivan Krastev summates this interaction: 
The major reason why Russians are reluctant to protest is not fear; it is 
because the people who care most have already left the country of have 
resolved to do so in the near future—or they may simply have moved to 
the virtual reality of the Internet (Russians on average spend twice as 
much time using online social networks as do their Western 
counterparts).227 
5. Censorship 
Gorbachev’s glasnost (“openness”) and Yeltsin’s democracy contributed to the 
end of the Soviet Union, and the floundering of the fledgling Russian Federation. Putin 
has slowly but unerringly reverted to censorship tactics that seem to come straight out of 
Stalinism. In the twenty-first century Russian Federation, directives are implied or issued 
in secrecy, and alternative narratives are quashed with minimal involvement from the 
state. 
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a. Deliberate Obfuscation 
As “hands on” as Putin may appear in his posted photographs, his directives are 
often secret or indirect. When protesters seized control of the Ukrainian presidential 
palace in February 2014, then-President Victor Yanukovych was nowhere to be found.228  
Russia did not admit to involvement in his departure until eight months later, when 
Vladimir Putin announced that his government had helped Yanukovych flee to Crimea 
and ultimately to Russia.229  In the same year, Putin sent Russian forces to secure 
Crimea, holding a supposedly open and fair referendum to determine whether or not 
Crimea should secede from Ukraine (very few states or global institutions have 
recognized the referendum as legitimate, to date). Putin initially denied Russian 
involvement, but later it was revealed that the “polite men” were sent into Crimea to 
secure the area before the vote.230 
b. Attacking Alternative Narratives 
Active censorship is generally carried out without any direct involvement from 
the state. In 2014, a Russian journalist named Roman Romanenko wrote a tongue-in-
cheek letter to President Putin, requesting that troops be sent to secure his own province, 
as there were Russian speakers there who were also denied basic human necessities and 
rights. The letter was never meant to be published, but somehow it found its way into 
social media. The response was vicious, pointed, and completely unofficial. Nazi 
swastikas and anti-Euromaidan graffiti appeared on the front of his home. Notices were 
sent to his neighbors: “To the knowledge of the residents of this apartment block—there 
is a Lviv scum living in your neighborhood who supports the West and the destruction of 
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Ukraine, blah-blah. Beware! The apartment of Romanenko, a Ukrainian Jew, may be 
used as an undercover headquarters of Ukrainian ‘patriots.’”231 
Romanenko’s treatment is hardly unique, and extends not only to protesters but 
also would-be political rivals.232  Protests and anti-Putin political meetings are often 
cancelled or broken up, either by thugs or police; the presentation of former Russian 
Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov’s openly-critical book, Without Putin, was prevented 
not only with a sudden loss of electricity but also twenty men who prevented entry to the 
event.233  Gary Kasparov faced harassment (in the form of flung ketchup, hurled eggs, 
and suddenly-closed meeting spaces) and a mass-media blackout while running for the 
presidency in 2008.234  Boris Nemtsov, a vocal opponent of Putin, was assassinated in 
Moscow, on February 2015.235 
Political tools and regulations also play a role. Kasyanov and Aleksey Navalny 
were denied candidacy as president in 2008 and 2015—allegedly, over 13% of the 
required two million signatures for Kasyanov’s bid were illegitimate, while Navalny’s 
party “registration was canceled after courts in 25 regions ruled that the Party of 
Progress’ offices had not been registered within the required time,” according to RT 
News.236  Political rival Mikhail Khodorkovsky, originally sentenced to eight years in 
prison in 2004 for fraud and tax evasion, had his prison term extended by an additional 
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five-and-a-half years in 2010.237 Voices against Putin are quickly silenced, in ways that 
cannot be traced back to the upper echelons of Russian government. 
B. CASE STUDY: PUSSY RIOT 
Pussy Riot presents an alternative narrative to Putin’s Russia, attacking the regime 
for its corruption and human rights abuses. Their contrasting propaganda attacks Russia 
on almost all fronts, an argument against the Russian Orthodox Church’s relationship 
with the state, the purported moral ascendency of Russian people, and Putin’s leadership 
over the federation.   
1. An Alternate Narrative: Holy Fools 
Pussy Riot claims that its protests are a form of “holy foolishness,” and that they 
themselves are “fools for Christ.” Holy foolishness is a (counter) cultural Russian 
Orthodox tradition of using radical and unorthodox behavior as a means of peaceful 
protest. The concept is based on Paul’s first Epistle to the Corinthians:238 
It seems to me that God has given the very last place to us apostles, like 
people condemned to die in public as a spectacle for the whole world of 
angels and of human beings. For Christ’s sake we are fools… We are 
clothed in rags, we are beaten… We are no more than this world’s 
garbage; we are the scum of the earth to this very moment! (1 Cor 4:9-13) 
Pussy Riot takes the idea of holy foolishness to an extreme. The use of English 
verbiage in the band name is a deliberate, provocative choice: in English, the word 
“pussy” is only dirty in one of its two meanings: a cat or a vagina. By contrast, there is no 
colloquial or even polite term for a vagina in Russian, however, so it can only be 
translated into Russian as pizda, a vulgar term for the female reproductive organ. One of 
the band members, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, was nine months pregnant in 2008, when 
she took part in a filmed orgy in a protest performance entitled, “Fuck for the Successor, 
Little Bear,” an obscene jab at Medvedev (Putin’s successor). At another point, a 
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different member of the band “was videotaped in a supermarket trying to stuff a raw 
chicken into her vagina,” according to journalist Anna Arutunyan.239 
On 21 February 2012, five members of Pussy Riot entered the Christ the Savior 
Cathedral, Russia’s largest church. Three of them ascended the stairs to the altar, entering 
an area reserved for priests alone according to church dogma. Provocatively dressed in 
bright tights and balaclavas, they began to dance while lip syncing to their song, “Virgin 
Mary, Put Putin Away” (see Appendix for full lyrics). Guards were quick to arrive, 
ejecting the protesters rapidly. A representative of the Church denounced the band, 
claiming, “This is a sin that violates the law of God… for the wages of sin is death (a 
reference to Romans 6:23). In early March, following Putin’s election, the performers 
were arrested and put on trial for “felony hooliganism” and “blasphemy.”240 
 
Figure 30.  Pussy Riot protest in Christ the Savior Cathedral241 
Pussy Riot is one of several activist groups that reject the narrative of Putin’s 
Russia in nearly every way. When Putin and Medvedev announced in 2011 that Putin 
                                                 
239 Arutunyan, Putin Mystique, 20–21. 
240 Court Transcript, as recorded in Pussy Riot: A Punk Prayer for Freedom (New York: Feminist 
Press, 2013), 53. 
241 Source: “Pussy Riot: The Story So Far,” BBC News, 23 December 2013, http://www.bbc.com/
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would be running for a third term in office, there were mass protests. Activists chanted 
phrases to tear down Putin: “You are not a Tsar, not a God,” (an attack on Putin’s support 
from the Russian Orthodox Church) and “I do not want you” (an attempt to remove some 
of Putin’s masculine appeal).242  The day after Putin’s electoral victory, another 
politician referred to the elections as “tantamount to rape,” according to Anna 
Arutunyan.243 
Pussy Riot’s song, “Virgin Mary, Put Putin Away,” makes similar arguments 
against the Putinist narrative. The song attacks the Orthodox Church for misogyny: “In 
order not to offend His Holiness / Women must give birth and love / Shit, shit, the Lord’s 
shit!”244  Then the lyrics call for the Virgin Mary to become a feminist, and rails against 
the ties of church and state, demanding, “Patriarch Gundyaev believes in Putin / Bitch, 
better believe in God instead.”245 
Despite their shock tactics, the band’s members have proven more than capable of 
expressing their views in a more articulate and coherent manner. In an open letter to 
Patriarch Kirill, the band members explained, “In the prayer in question, we expressed 
our grief… that you had allowed the religion to become a weapon in a dirty political 
campaign.”246  A similar letter addressed to President Medvedev mentioned suppressive 
atrocities committed by the regime, including the long-term imprisonment of Putin’s 
political rivals and detractors.247 
2. Censorship 
Putin has dealt with Pussy Riot in a manner characteristic of his regime. There 
have been no public directives from the upper echelons of the Russian state concerning 
the three women. Nevertheless, the band was imprisoned for their actions in the 
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cathedral, and it would not be the last time that they would be attacked for their 
statements. 
a. Deliberate Obfuscation 
Putin has been careful to express his displeasure without directly tying himself to 
the court case. Days after the election, a spokesman declared that Putin’s view of the 
band’s “disgusting” protest was “negative.”248  In an interview for Russia Today, the 
state-controlled English language news channel, Putin asked the reporter to translate the 
band’s name into Russian, pointing out the unavoidable obscenity with a proper 
translation, undermining the moral fiber of the Russian populace.249  Putin adopted a 
more lenient tone at other times, expressing his hope that “the court issues a correct 
decision,” and that the band members should not be punished “too strictly.”250 
b. Attacking Pussy Riot 
Putin’s supporters were quick to latch onto his message. Patriarch Kirill fully 
supported incarceration for the band, and attacked them openly: “Those people don’t 
believe in the power of prayer, they believe in the power of propaganda, in the power of 
lies and slander, in the power of Internet and mass media, in the power of money and 
weapons.”251  Other forms of attack seemed to come from the general Russian populace. 
At a Russian youth festival in 2013, a video game entitled “Don’t Let Pussy Riot into the 
Cathedral” was released, in which players would kill balaclava-wearing band members 
with a gold Orthodox cross before the performers could reach a cathedral.252 
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Figure 31.  “Don’t Let Pussy Riot into the Cathedral”253 
While there is no concrete evidence tying Putin to the verdict, his insinuated 
directives seem to have been followed to the letter. The three women were taken to trial 
on charges of “felony hooliganism,” as well as having “mocked and challenged Orthodox 
Christendom by exerting negative psycho-emotional influence on a group of 
believers.”254  The prosecution recommended two to three years of incarceration for each 
of the three protesters. Initially, all three of the accused retained the services of lawyer 
Mark Feygin, whose passionate defense made the trial even more political and 
inflammatory. In October, Yekaterina Samutsevich switched to a less fiery attorney, who 
simply pointed out that the guard had stopped Samutsevich before she began performing. 
All three women were sentenced to two years in a penal colony, but the non-political 
approach was enough to have Samutsevich’s sentence suspended.255 
3. Conclusion 
The 2012 trial and subsequent incarceration of the two Pussy Riot members were 
characteristic of Putin’s regime in a defensive posture. While making no decrees to attack 
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the band, Putin did express his displeasure and his thoughts on sentencing—wishes that 
were carried out. In doing so, the state avoided blame for any possible blowback from the 
incident, while essentially condoning attacks upon the perpetrators. This practice would 
continue at the Sochi Olympics, with regular state harassment and interference of the 
band, independent of public orders from the higher echelons of the government. 
C. CASE STUDY: WINTER OLYMPICS IN SOCHI, 2014 
The Winter Olympics in Sochi was, at the time, the centerpiece of positive 
Russian propaganda. Nevertheless, it faced its detractors and dissidents, both from within 
and without. The case is best examined in a non-chronological, thematic order: the 
intended Russian narrative (both as presented before the games, and during the Olympic 
opening ceremonies), followed by critical attacks and controversies, and finally the 
regime’s response to those attacks. Ultimately, the event illustrated the Russian message 
and the current regime’s response to dissident narratives. 
1. Russian Narrative 
The Sochi Olympics were intended to bolster Russian prominence through every 
aspect of its narrative under Putin’s leadership. In the years leading up to the games, vast 
resources were devoted to making the games a demonstration of the new Russian 
Federation. At the opening ceremonies, however, Russia was unable to cite modern 
achievements, and had to rely upon the heritage of Tsarist and Soviet achievement almost 
exclusively. 
a. Modern Narrative 
The Olympics in Sochi represented the Putinist Russian narrative in multiple 
aspects. The transformation of Sochi itself, from an obsolete and snowy city to a winter 
games resort, was meant to establish Russian greatness, with incredible expense: Russia 
spent an estimated $51 billion on the spectacle.256 According to RT News, “at the torch 
relay ceremony, the Russian president said the Olympic flame would travel through all 
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regions of country, and ‘will show Russia to the world as it really is, as the one we all 
love.’ Russia’s scale, unique character and beauty, including its natural and cultural 
wealth, will be on full display during the relay, Putin said.”257 Putin’s own image was 
boosted primarily through media coverage of his personal involvement with the event. 
The RT news website claimed that Putin personally arrived in Sochi a year before the 
Olympics to monitor the site’s progress, giving officials a hard time over delays and even 
firing the vice-president of Russia’s Olympic Committee.258 Naturally, Putin would be 
centrally-placed as the head-of-state during the Olympic ceremonies and games as well 
(see Figure 32). 
 
Figure 32.  Putin with the Olympic torch in Moscow’s Red Square.259 
b. Claimed Continuities with Previous Regimes 
The Olympic opening ceremony laid claim to Tsarist and Soviet achievements, in 
both culture and technology. The initial pageant was a tribute to Russian and Soviet 
advancements. Among the Tsarist Russian narrative claims were Fyodor Dostoevsky 
(novelist), Catherine the Great, Vasily Zhukovsky (poet), Peter the Great (referenced not 
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only by the boat upon which the children in the pageant traveled but also the “Russian 
Empire” slide with his likeness), Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky (composer), Kazimir 
Malevich (painter), Dmitri Mendeleev’s periodic table, Sergei Diaghilev’s Russian ballet, 
the television (Russian scientist Constantin Perskyi did not invent the television, but did 
coin the term), the ushanka winter hat, Khokhloma painting style, Konstantin 
Tsiolkovsky (his work on rocketry belonged to both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union),  
Anton Chekhov (playwright), Alexey Shchusev (architect; like Tsiolkovsky, his work 
bridged Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union), and Alexander Pushkin (poet, playwright, 
and novelist). The pageant’s Soviet references included Yuri Gagarin, Hedgehog in the 
Fog (a 1975 Soviet film), the Russian “corn mowing machine” (invented by A. R. 
Vlasenko in Tsarist Russia but put into production by the Soviet Union), the Lunokhod 
lunar rover program, the Mir space station, the Sputnik-1 satellite, Sergei Eisenstein 
(filmmaker, director), the parachute (the first knapsack parachute was developed by Gleb 
Kotelnikov). Naturally, the more violent aspects of the October Revolution and Stalin’s 
regime were glossed over.260 
After the pageant, the Sretensky Monastery Men’s Choir performed the Russian 
national anthem, with Russian (and formerly Soviet) cosmonauts bearing the flag.261  The 
anthem itself represents a holdover from the Soviet Union. Commissioned by the Soviet 
Union to replace the Communist “Internationale” in 1944, “The Hymn of the Soviet 
Union” lyrics were initially dedicated to (and edited by) Stalin, as well as victory over the 
fascist Nazi invaders.262  After Khrushchev’s “secret” denunciation of Stalin, the song 
lost its lyrics, becoming instrumental only until 1977, when the same lyricist (Sergey 
Mikhalkov) was commissioned to write new lyrics without the references to Stalin.263  
The Russian Federation under Yeltsin adopted a new national anthem, but in 2000 Putin 
reinstated the old national anthem with new lyrics by Mikhalkov, putting fresh words on 
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a very familiar tune.264  From the flag of Peter the Great to the cosmonauts and the 
“Hymn of the Soviet Union,” there was very little that could be called “new” in the 
narrative of opening ceremonies. 
2. Controversies 
The Sochi Olympics had two types of narrative dissonance: protests from the 
West (primarily concerning the rights of homosexual athletes) and protests from within 
(environmentalists and political protesters, such as Pussy Riot). Putin dealt with each of 
these controversies in a predictable fashion, giving the slightest of nods to Western 
sensibilities regarding homosexuality while Russian protesters were savagely repressed. 
a. Homosexuals Welcome, “But Leave the Children Alone, Please” 
The August 2013 law, forbidding “propaganda of homosexuality among minors,” 
was widely seen as an affront to homosexuals, both for attacking their sexual preference 
and for equating homosexuality with pedophilia.265  Gay rights activists launched a 
campaign against the law, primarily using Western media to call for a boycott on the 
game.266 The RT news website accused the U.S. of politicizing the games, arguing that 
the U.S. was sending “openly gay athletes” to show that “in their country gay rights have 
been established.”267 Russian Orthodox Church officials pushed for stricter legislation, 
including the criminalization of homosexuality itself.268  Putin did not revoke or change 
the law, but made it clear that homosexuals were welcome—yet he still needed to clarify 
by adding, “but leave the children alone, please.”269  In the eyes of the Russian 
government, homosexuality appears to be just a step away from pedophilia. 
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b. No Protests and No Riots; Profanity and Pussy Riot 
Putin’s regime took indirect action to prevent protests from affecting the 
Olympics in any way. Environmemtal activists Suren Gazaryan and Evgeniy Vitishko 
were arrested and given three-year conditional sentences for “painting graffiti on a 
construction fence surrounding a dacha said to belong to the governor of the Krasnodar 
region, Aleksandr Tkachev,” according to Human Rights Watch.270 The two 
environmentalists were assigned a curfew and ordered to inform Russian authorities of 
their whereabouts and movements.271 In November 2013, Vitishko was accused of 
violating his curfew twice, and a Russian court sentenced him to spend three years in the 
Tuapse penal colony.272 The environmentalist appealed the decision, remaining free 
during the appeals process; until 3 February 2014, when he was placed in fifteen days of 
detention for “allegedly swearing in a public place.”273 As with other forms of 
suppression in Russia, there were no direct ties between the government and the actions 
of the courts. 
Russia banned protests of and at the Olympics, in legislation that was used to 
justify cracking down on anything that might cast aspersions on the games.274  Activists 
and the Western media attacked this policy, and Russia gave a slight concession: protests 
and rallies could be “staged only after agreeing with Sochi municipal authorities and the 
regional department of the Interior Ministry,” according to the Kremlin press service.275  
Nadezhda Tolokonnikova and Maria Alyokhina of Pussy Riot had been recently released 
by Putin after serving two years in a penal colony for their performance at Christ the 
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Savior Cathedral.276  They travelled with their band to Sochi, to protest Putin’s regime at 
the games. Prior to their performance in Sochi, the band was detained at their hotel for 
suspicion in a theft, and allegedly beaten by police afterwards.277  At the protest, police 
and Cossacks took part in beating and detaining the band members—local police officials 
claimed that they only took “all necessary measures to stop the scuffle.”278  The assaults 
on Tolokonnikova and Alyokhina continued after the Olympics, with attacks on 6 March 
and 14 March 2014.279  These beatings and assaults could not be tied in any way to the 
government, but they occurred commonly enough to establish a pattern—even if they 
were not ordered, these attacks were allowed to continue. 
3. Conclusion 
The Olympics demonstrated that Putin’s regime has not deviated much from the 
blueprints laid by Tsarist and Stalinist Russia. Modern communication and sentiment 
have forced Putin to couch his language at times, such as paying lip service to the rights 
of homosexuals while offering thinly-veiled insults. His attacks on dissenters have to be 
covert or legally justifiable, while never connected to his office directly. As much as the 
Olympics were trying to show a modern Russia, it revealed only that Russia has not yet 
truly changed its course. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Putin’s regime employs a mixture of Tsarist and Stalinist narratives, blending the 
two in an effort to keep the Russian people content despite the evidence of human rights 
violations. Traditionalist worship in the Russian Orthodox Church is not only permitted, 
but encouraged, while church officials ensure that their flock supports the current regime. 
Russia continues to pursue the status of a global power, in keeping with its inherited 
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imperial status, putting the state at odds with the West and, in particular, NATO. A 
mixture of Pan-Slavism and irredentism is used to justify paramilitary and military 
operations in Russia’s neighboring states, while the regime’s detractors are silenced with 
Byzantine legal proceedings. In short, much of this regime’s narrative has been 
borrowed.   
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V. SCORECARD AND CONCLUSION 
Putin’s narrative is closely aligned to the narratives of the Tsars and of Stalin’s 
Soviet Union, creating a stagnant viewpoint even among the people that is unlikely to 
change readily. The population has more access to Western ideas and culture than ever 
before, but the modern Russian state has adapted, using television and the Internet to 
provide its own version of events and to further this narrative. Change is always a 
possibility, but at this point it seems to be a distant one. 
A. SCORECARD: NARRATIVE CONTINUITIES 
Putin’s regime shows an adaptation of every aspect of Tsarist and Stalinist 
narrative propagation, including censorship methods. These processes are not rarely 
manifested in the exact same manner—the regime seems to have adapted the various 
tools of previous regimes to fit today’s world. Nevertheless, in almost every aspect 
Putin’s regime shows a direct continuity with its predecessors. 
(1) Russian Orthodoxy 
Russian Orthodoxy has acted as both rival and partner under the Tsars, but were 
politically emasculated over time. The very term “Tsar” was enacted to show the head of 
state to not only be a political head, but also a sacral figure. Peter the Great further 
emasculated the church, removing the patriarchate and making the symbolic move of the 
capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg. In the Soviet Union, Lenin treated them as a rival 
during his reign; but under Stalin the church was re-established as a political asset for the 
state, with the extra benefit of being tied to the state’s security apparatus. It is unclear 
how strongly the ties exist between the church and Russia’s current security system, but 
Russian Orthodox leaders clearly support the current regime, even going so far as to 
claim Putin’s presidency to be a “miracle of God.”  Putin has not only kept the church as 




(2) Great State 
The Tsars defined Russia more by its imperial status than by a cultural one, 
leaning on military triumph and territorial expansion to claim its place among the 
European nations. The Soviet Union was a close parallel, claiming the military triumph 
over the Third Reich as perhaps its defining achievement, while maintaining a hegemony 
in Eastern Europe via the Warsaw Pact. The Russian Federation seemed to have lost its 
place in the once bipolar balance of power, but under Putin it has done its best to reclaim 
its status as a great power, creating frozen conflicts in neighboring states to maintain its 
hegemony. 
(3) Russianness 
The concept of being Russia does not seem to have evolved much since the days 
of Catherine the Great. Lenin and Stalin downplayed Russian status (as opposed to Soviet 
citizenship), until the Great Patriotic War when Stalin exploited Russian sentimentality to 
motivate his Red Army. The ideas of Pan-Slavism and Russification seem to apply as 
much to the Russians of today as they did to the Russians under the Tsars; these ideas are 
often mingled with irredentism to justify Russia’s conflict in neighboring states. 
(4) Cult of Personality 
Alexander III and Nicholas II did not have full cults of personality, though they 
employed elements of mass media and propaganda to further their political power. 
Ultimately, these half-measures weakened the regime—it was not until Stalin’s regime 
that the Russian people were exposed to a complete modern cult of personality. Putin 
seems to have adapted Stalin’s model to fit today’s world, using the majority of the same 
concepts, but bringing back the sacral image of the leader, while abandoning the closed 
borders of the Soviet system. 
(5) Censorship 
Russia has never been long without intrusive state censorship. Under the Tsars, 
the system of destroying alternative narratives was extensive and official, coming from 
direct government orders. Stalin’s system innovated, allowing the leader to not only veto 
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materials, but also to have a direct hand in the creative process itself. At the same time, 
the Soviet system hid its tracks, making it difficult to track official decisions that might 
backfire. Putin’s regime operates in a similar fashion, suppressing alternative narratives 
indirectly while maintaining a distance between the leader himself and the methods of 
censorship. 
B. CONCLUSION: BUSINESS AS USUAL, FOR NOW 
On the surface, Russia is a modern democracy, holding open elections to appoint 
its legislature and president. Based on Putin and Medvedev’s continual regime, trading 
prime minister and presidential positions every one to two terms, it is unlikely that Putin 
will ever have to cede power during his lifetime. While Putin is leading the government, 
Russia is likely to maintain its current narrative and posture, pressing to further its image 
as a global power through a combination of frozen conflicts and aggressive media 
manipulation. Eventually, Putin will leave office, whether by resignation or other means. 
When that happens, the Russian Federation may have a chance to move toward a more 
liberal democracy. Nevertheless, the narrative that has been propagated and maintained 
from the time of the Tsars until the present day is unlikely to permit such a shift to occur 
quickly or easily.  
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APPENDIX. VIRGIN MARY, PUT PUTIN AWAY (PUNK PRAYER) 
Virgin Mary, Mother of God, put Putin away 
Рut Putin away, put Putin away 
(End chorus) 
 
Black robe, golden epaulettes 
All parishioners crawl to bow 
The phantom of liberty is in heaven 
Gay-pride sent to Siberia in chains 
 
The head of the KGB, their chief saint, 
Leads protesters to prison under escort 
In order not to offend His Holiness 
Women must give birth and love 
 
Shit, shit, the Lord’s shit! 
Shit, shit, the Lord’s shit! 
 
(Chorus) 
Virgin Mary, Mother of God, become a feminist 




The Church’s praise of rotten dictators 
The cross-bearer procession of black limousines 
A teacher-preacher will meet you at school 
Go to class - bring him money! 
 
Patriarch Gundyaev believes in Putin 
Bitch, better believe in God instead 
The belt of the Virgin can’t replace mass-meetings 
Mary, Mother of God, is with us in protest! 
 
(Chorus) 
Virgin Mary, Mother of God, put Putin away 
Рut Putin away, put Putin away 
(End chorus)280 
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